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Executive Summary 
1  This report has been prepared for the  Commission of the European Communities by 
KPMG Peat Marwick.  It sets out the content, findings and  conclusions of a study to 
assess  the  factors  which  affect  the  competitiveness of the  European  Community 
shipyards, and to propose ways and means to enhance it in the context of the internal 
market.  The  study  covers only those  yards  involved in  the  new building  of sea-
going merchant ships of not less than 100 grt. 
2  There  are  many  factors  that  determine  competitiveness which was defined  as  'the 
ability  to  win  and  execute  shipbuilding  orders  in  open competition,  and  stay  in 
business'.  The  study  has  therefore  had  a  broad  scope  and  covered  issues 
surrounding: 
market structures and accessibility; 
•  product strategy and  innovation; 
•  shipyard effectiveness and efficiencies; 
the role of finance. 
3  There were three main phases in our approach to the study: 
•  market  analysis of the focus  countries,  ie the European Community, Japan, 
Korea and Finland using published information sources; 
•  comparative  data gathering on performance  and  use of best practice in 40 
representative  EC yards  and  eight  significant competitors  in  international 
product  markets  in Korea,  Japan  and  Finland.  Discussions were also held 
with a range of shipowners and industry suppliers to integrate their views; 
analysis of research findings  and  the  development of options  for  improving 
competitive performance. 
Market share performance 
4  The  EC  share  of world  ship  production  remained  relatively constant  during  the 
1980s,  a period  that saw a sharp  rise in Korean  production and  a relative decline in ' 
Japanese  share.  In  terms  of  success  in  winning  new  orders,  the  EC  has  lost 
competitiveness since 1988.  In 1991,  for the first time, Korean shipyards won more 
orders than the total EC industry. 
5  EC shipbuilders currently  have a relatively strong market share in container and dry 
cargo ships, and passenger and "other ships".  In contrast, share is relatively weak in 
gas  carriers, and very weak in tankers  and  bulk carriers.  This division is not fully 
explained by the level of technology in the ship. 
6  60%  of EC production is for EC based shipowners of whom  they have a 66%  share 
of demand.  In contrast both Japanese and  Korean shipbuilders  have virtually 100% 
of demand from  their respective home based owners. 
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International comparisons 
7  The EC industry is  very fragmented.  In Japan the seven major groupings account 
for 92% of order books  and  over 80%  of production,  in Korea four  companies for 
90%  of both orders  and production, and  in Finland two companies  for over 80%. 
With only  three  major shipbuilding  groupings,  accounting  for  about  25%  of the 
industry,  the  EC  industry  is  predominantly  composed  of  small  autonomous 
companies,  though with examples of single  yards  competing  successfully as  world 
leaders in specialist product categories.  In contrast there is very strong integration in 
Japan  between shipowners, charterers, suppliers,  financial  and  trading  houses  and 
shipbuilders. 
8  One consequence of the fragmentation is the very wide variety between yards across 
the  EC  industry  in  terms  of business  objectives,  management  approach,  use  of 
technology  and  performance.  There  would  appear to  be  no  strong  correlation 
between performance  and  shipyard  ownership,  nor significant differences between 
single yards as  a whole and those which are members of groups.  By performance we 
mean a relatively broad measure encompassing internal efficiency, build cycle times, 
order winning capability and profitability. 
9  On this measure our research has  shown that the EC yards can be divided into three 
groups  of approximately equal size:  above  average,  average  and  below average. 
There  should  also  be a  further division  into  the  'main  international'  yards  and 
'smaller'  yards.  This division is based not on performance, which is similar for the 
two divisions, but on how that performance is  achieved. 
'Smaller' yards typically: 
•  build  for  EC  based  owners  and  cite  other  EC  builders  as  the  main 
competition; 
mainly build dry cargo ships, small tankers, fishing and service vessels; 
are low overhead operations with limited management resources. 
'Main international'  yards typically: 
•  target  a wider  base  of owners  and  compete  more  directly  with Japanese, 
Korean and Finnish shipbuilders; 
mainly build containerships, tankers, bulk carriers, passenger vessels, reefers 
and dredgers; 
have more resources in non-direct production activities. 
Within 'main  international'  yards,  whilst there  are  no  significant  differences  on 
performance  measures, our research has shown variations in how that performance is 
achieved between the types of yard ownership.  For example, yards that are part of a 
shipbuilding  group, which are  predominantly state  owned, tend to  have higher levels 
of investment in advanced  technology  than  other  yards.  Conversely, independent 
yards  and  those  owned  by  shipowners  were  shown  to  have  higher  ratings  on 
marketing and customer related issues. 
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10  Within each of the non-EC countries visited, perfonnance between yards was much 
more even and this despite the fact that in Japan  we selected yards  from  four of the 
seven  major  groupings  and  different  sizes of yards  within  the  groupings.  The 
international comparison shows that only the very top of the 'main international' EC 
above  average group  matches Japanese perfonnance levels;  Finnish yards perfonn 
similarly to  the bottom of the EC above average group;  and  Korean  yards  are very 
much in line with the EC average. 
20  EC above  I  Japan 
30  average yards 
40  l::d  Performance  50  EC avera_g_e yards 
Measure  60 
70  EC below 
80  average yards 
90 
100 
110 
Notes:  Indicative measure  taken  as  total man-hours  per CGT  produced  including 
indirect and sub-contract elements.  For details see Appendices 3 and 4. 
11  Evidence from  an analysis of the relationship between output and productivity based 
on figures  derived from the yards visited would suggest that EC yards as a whole and 
the non-EC yards lie on different long run cost curves, which in tum implies that EC 
and non-EC yards represent different use of technologies. 
12  This was confinned  by our assessment of the  use of technology  in  the  shipyards 
visited  which was  based  on  methods  used  by  the  consulting  team  in previous 
shipyard  studies in the US, Brazil, UK and Spain and also in other industries.  By use 
of technology  we  mean  both  advanced  technology  and  management  skills  and 
techniques  which we  have combined as  "best practice".  By this means we looked at 
each of the  seven key  functional  areas  of shipyard  operations  being  strategy and 
management,  marketing,  purchasing,  human  resources,  design  and  technical,  ' 
planning  and  production.  Where  appropriate, benefits  the  yard obtained  by  being 
part of a larger group were  assessed and  incorporated.  The comparisons  are shown 
in the table below as index numbers representing the level of technology, with 100 as 
the average for all international yards. 
Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
Overall  Mana_g_ement  Marketing Purchasing Resources Technical Planning Production 
EC  average  96  98  89  96  108  97  84  100 
group 
Japan  111  116  109  118  115  97  113  107 
Korea  104  98  128  84  115  92  84  109 
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13  The overview  results  do  show  significantly more  use  of best practice in Japanese 
yards compared  to the EC average group, with the exception of the design/technical 
area.  Korean yards were broadly similar to  the EC average group but with particular 
strengths  in  marketing  and  weakness in purchasing.  The  Finnish  figures  are  not 
directly  comparable  because  they  relate  almost  exclusively  to  passengership 
building.  However, there  is  strength  in  marketing,  design/technical, planning  and 
production. 
Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
Overall  Manaeement  Marketine Purchasine Resources Technical Plannine Production 
Finland  106  95  114  91  94  120  Ill  108 
Variations between European shipyards 
14  There  are similarly significant differences in  the adoption of best practice across EC 
yards. 
Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
Overall  Mana2ement Marketine PurchasinJl  Resources Technical Plannin2 Production 
EC  above  117  134  122  118  115  110  115  107 
average 
EC  average  96  98  89  96  108  97  84  100 
EC  below  88  75  85  86  81  97  100  89 
avera2e 
15  On strategy and management issues, the above average performing yards have a high 
degree  of focus  on  a  specific target  market.  This focus  links  through  to  clear , 
management  objectives and  actions in each functional  area.  In contrast, the below 
average yards  stress the need for flexibility and tend to be trying to service a number 
of different  markets with  a mix  of one-off builds and  short series.  This leads to 
confusion in co-ordinating departmental organisation structures and  in the allocation 
of resources. 
16  On  marketing,  the  higher  performing  yards  tend  to  have  clearly  identified  and 
targeted owners, have a policy of pro-active contact with shipowners, see after-sales as 
another  contact  opportunity  not  just  a  cost,  and  use  their own  resources  with 
minimum  use  of agents.  The below average  yards  tend  to  be  totally  re-active to 
enquiries,  view orders as  one-offs  rather than part of a long term  relationship with 
shipowners,  have  no  clear  product  development  priorities  and  have  very  few 
resources  in sales and marketing.  In some yards only two or three individuals out of 
4,000 plus had sales responsibilities.  In contrast, Japanese and better performing EC 
yards devoted about 2.5% of manpower to  this business winning role. 
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17  In purchasing,  the above  average yards  tended to  have reduced to  only two or three 
suppliers in each area, to operate with few  sourcing restrictions and  to have explored 
economies  of scale by  linking on  purchasing  with other yards.  The below average 
yards  tended to operate within more constraints imposed by their lack of knowledge 
or external financing sources and to use traditional buyer/supplier relationships. 
1 8  In human resources,  the  major differences  between the  above  and  below  average 
yards are in four key areas: 
•  the emphasis on upgrading skills; 
•  the effort to  restructure the workforce through recruitment; 
•  the degree of employee empowerment; 
•  mu1ti-skilling and re-skilling. 
1  9  On  design  and  technical issues,  above  average  yards  have  invested  heavily  in 
CAD/CAM systems and  equipment with  careful implementation,  the  production of 
specific  workstation  information  and  increasingly  full  CAD/CAM  generation of 
manufacturing information  with DNC links.  Some of the average and below average 
yards  have  made  the  investment but implementation  has  been  ineffective and  not 
integrated with other operations. 
20  In planning for production, the high performing yards have decentralised multi-level 
planning  systems with clearly defined outputs  at each level, a work package approach 
to organisation of worlc,  formal  Build Strategy documentation,  computerised material 
control systems and  pre-production marshalling of kits of parts.  The below average 
yards are ineffective in these areas. 
2 1  On production,  above  average yards  have short build  cycles to  maximise the  use of 
facilities.  This  is  achieved  by  implementing  workstation  concepts  with  clearly 
defined  process  flows,  superior  build  sequences  and  early  outfitting techniques. 
There  is a high  priority on  accuracy control  and both designing and  organising out 
needless  work.  Below  average  yards  tend  to  use  a  more  traditional  sequential 
approach to  ship construction. 
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22  Our study has shown a clear relationship between the use of best practices, improved 
performance and profitability.  This can be summarised as: 
Best  practice  Performance  Profitability 
measure  measure  measure 
EC above 
average  117  150  91 
EC average  96  105  70 
EC below 
average  88  65  23 
NB:  Profitability measure  is  based  on percentage  of Chief Executives claiming 
their yard  is  currently  breaking  even or in  profit.  For details  see Section 
3.16. 
Agenda for the EC shipbuilding industry 
2 3  The objective of the EC industry must be to meet the needs of worldwide shipowners 
better than its competitors.  If allowed to compete on a fair basis with the best in the 
world, the industry will be better placed to meet the needs of Community shipowners, 
and on a more general basis the Community marine and transportation sectors.  That 
success is possible is shown by those  EC yards  which have  achieved a position of 
world  class competitiveness by  identifying  a sector to  compete  in and  organising 
themselves and the resources available in the most effective way. 
24  The AWES market projections show rapid growth in the total  worldwide demand for 
shipbuilding  in the  late  1990s.  Japanese  and  Korean  industries are  planning  for 
further  dramatic  improvements  in  productivity  by  the  year  2000.  To  at  least 
maintain the  EC share  at about  23%  of world production,  the key  priorities for EC 
shipbuilders must be to: 
maintain access to current markets; 
•  reduce its cost base; 
meet increased demand through productivity improvement; 
ensure it can build the right products. 
2 5  Most yards  are  planning for productivity  improvements in the range  of 3 to  6%  a 
year in the short term  but  many  do  not  have such targets.  This  level of internal 
development  is  insufficient  to  improve  the  competitive  position of the  industry 
significantly.  Among the  average and below  average yards, there appears  to be little 
recognition  or acceptance  of the  differences  in performance between  yards  - or 
awareness of the reasons for those differences. 
2 6  There  is  relatively little,  though  increasing,  co-operation  within  the  industry  in 
comparison to Japan.  The major motivation is for economies of scale, particularly in 
purchasing,  but also in project design and, to  a lesser extent, facilities sharing.  There 
are few  effective mechanisms for technology transfer. 
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27  The tasks for the management teams of EC shipyards therefore are to: 
•  ensure the use of appropriate best practice in all areas; 
develop  opportunities  to  access  economies  of  scale  and  transfer  of 
technology through increased co-operation with other economic operators. 
2 8  The  objective for  the industry,  and  the determinant of long  term competitiveness, 
must be that each shipyard should have: 
a clear business strategy focusing on core product markets and stating how it 
will compete and how it will organise itself to compete; 
a  clear,  fully  resourced  marketing  programme,  appropriate  product 
development activity and a considered after sales policy; 
a  purchasing  policy  featuring  a  minimum  number of suppliers, effective 
supply chain management and strategic use of sub-contracting; 
human  resources  management  emphasing  skills  upgrading  and  multi-
skilling, distributed decision making and effective recruitment; 
design  and  technical  systems  with  appropriate  use  of  technology  and 
integration into downstream systems; 
planning  and  production  engineering  to  improve  build  strategies  and 
minimise build cycle times; 
•  appropriate production facilities, technologies and automation. 
Constraints external to the shipyards 
29  While  a  large  part  of  the  difference  in  competitive  performance  between  the 
industries reviewed can be explained by  reference to  the use of best practice, there 
are a number of significant constraints on EC  shipbuilders which include: 
home  credit schemes and  national building  programmes  in both Korea  and 
Japan which effectively exclude EC builders from these markets; 
unfair competition from  Korea through non-OECD rules finance  schemes; 
an  inability  to  access  comparable  economies  of scale  because  of  the 
fragmented industry structure both in shipbuilding and the supply industry; 
•  sourcing  constraints through the continuation of internal barriers  and  non-
harmonised standards in the EC marine equipment internal market; 
a  comparatively low  R&D capability, particularly against  Japan and  Korea, 
where  shipbuilders can more easily transfer technology from  related  group 
companies  and  have  the  support of the massive R&D facilities  within the 
heavy industries  groupings of which they are part,  as  well as  drawing upon 
the government sponsored infrastructure. 
exchange rate movements given that market prices are usually in US  $. 
3 0  It is clear that there  are markets which  are  not open for  fair competition from  EC 
shipbuilders  with effective  entry  barriers  to  Japanese  and  Korean  markets  which 
account for 27% of total world demand.  Also  there is evidence that orders are being 
won in the  EC  market by  Korean shipbuilders  offering terms  more  attractive than 
OECD  guidelines.  Continuing  priority  should  be  given  by  the  Commission  to 
negotiating  the elimination of these unfair competitive practices through  OECD and 
other  mechanisms  and  to  reviewing  the  positive  use  of  existing  mechanisms 
including  matching  credit  facilities,  New  Commercial  Policy  Instruments  and 
countervailing duties. 
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3 1  Within Japanese shipowners there would appear to  be low awareness of the current 
capabilities of EC builders which is, in part,  a reflection of the success of the entry 
barriers.  Given the scale of the problem and the strength of the Japanese market, it is 
unlikely  that  the  industry  would  be  able  to  fund  the  necessary  programme  to 
increase awareness and  promote EC  shipbuilders.  There is a case for establishing a 
'EC  Ship  Centre'  in  both  Japan  and  Korea  which  could  have  responsibilities 
including: 
•  promotion of the EC shipbuilding (and marine equipment) industries; 
•  identifying equipment sourcing opportunities for EC shipbuilders; 
•  monitoring developments and competitiveness in the market; 
identifying and promoting joint ventures and co-operative working. 
The establishment of such centres  would  potentially  have  an  important  signalling 
role in developing appropriate bi-lateral arrangements. 
32  The measures  taken under the  seventh directive on shipbuilding are  leading to  a 
convergence of subsidies within an overall policy of eventual. elimination.  Shipyard 
competitiveness is  also  impacted  by  the  continuation  of differentials  across  the 
Community, particularly in terms of: 
•  home credit schemes in those aspects not covered by the seventh directive; 
•  standards and non-tariff barriers for equipment and materials; 
•  restrictions  linked  to  financing  arrangements on sourcing of materials and 
equipment. 
From the  perspective of an efficient shipbuilding industry, we believe that these areas 
should  be  harmonised  across  the  Community  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner 
applicable across internal borders. 
3 3  Judging  by  the  general  reaction  of shipbuilders  included  in  our programme,  the 
Maritime Industries Forum would  appear to  have been well received in terms of the 
information  exchange  and  process  for  developing  common  views.  We recommend 
that this concept is  extended into  a  series of fora/conventions  organised  on a pan- , 
European  basis and  dedicated in turn  to  each of the  areas of best practice within 
shipbuilding.  Each forum  would  focus  on  case  studies from  one or more  of the 
centres of excellence and  on practical implementation in different circumstances. 
34  A  key  feature  of the  Japanese  structure  is  the  support  contract  for  transferring 
technology  between shipyards in the  same grouping,  or in some cases in different 
groupings.  We  are aware of very few  examples within  the  European Community. 
We believe that this process of yard to  yard transfer should be  positively encouraged 
by the Commission and particularly  where cross-border transfers of best practice are 
involved. 
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35  The  R&D  framework  supporting  the  industry  is  extensive  and  multi-layered. 
However, given the fragmented nature of the industry,  in our view there is a role that 
is  not currently being filled and that is  an overall co-ordination role  within a clear 
perspective of a future market.  This role is to: 
•  clearly  articulate  a  future  market  demand,  for  example  road-to-sea 
transportation similar to the Japanese TSL project.  In most cases these would 
be  developed  out  of the  overall  EC  maritime  industries  policy.  The 
articulation would  require a specification of the needs to  be  met and likely 
market size and would demand close consultation with potential owners; 
•  analyse the required underlying technologies and identify the state of the art, 
proposing transfer from other industries as  appropriate; 
catalyse development where there are gaps in technologies; 
•  ensure  technology  transfer  into  the  EC  industry  for  competitive 
commercialisation. 
3 6  The Maritime Industries Forum is  a potential mechanism for  fulfilling this role.  On 
completion of its current programme, we  recommend  that the results of the Forum 
are reviewed  against the role that has been identified here,  with a view to  putting it 
onto a permanent basis. 
3 7  The  competitiveness  of the  EC  shipbuilding  industry  is  dependent  upon  the 
equipment  supply industry.  Imports  of machinery  built in Korea or Japan under 
European  licences  are  increasing and  the  EC  industry broadly  consists of a large 
variety of mostly medium-sized  companies.  The ability of this  industry to  meet the 
future  needs  of EC shipbuilders  and  their incorporation into  an  overall maritime 
policy requires urgent review. 
3 8  The  European  Commission  has  already  initiated  the  wider  debate  through  the 
Martime  Industries  Forum,  to  assist  in  developing  a  policy  to  improve  the 
competitiveness of the EC maritime  sector.  This report  can only re-emphasise the 
need  for such an integrated  approach.  We  would  recommend  that DGIII looks to 
issue a green paper following up  the Forum  and parallel research programmes, which 
will assist in creating an  appropriate business  environment for  the EC  industry by 
providing  a longer term  policy framework for  market development, and  be a major , 
component for a fully  integrated EC transport policy. 
Overview 
3 9  The EC shipbuilding industry has lost market share in terms of new orders and there 
are  many recent reports of yards with low  or zero order books, and indeed corporate 
failures.  However, within this general picture of gloom,  there is  a minority of yards 
with high capacity utilisation and extended order books.  While the detailed story for 
each  successful  yard  is  unique,  our  study  has  shown  a  common  thread  to  be 
awareness  of best  practice  and  positive  moves  to  achieve  improved  levels  of 
performance. 
40  Our study has also  shown that among many  of the average  and below average yards, 
there  is little acceptance of the differences that exist or understanding  of the reasons 
for  them.  Unless this situation changes dramatically, there  is little reason to suppose 
that the total EC share of the  world market will recover, or even hold at  its currently 
depressed level. 
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41  However, whilst emphasing that the major areas of potential improvement are within 
the  control  of  individual  shipyards,  we  have  identified  a  number  of  industry 
constraints where Commission initiatives would be positively beneficial. 
42  Our survey has shown no indication of a 'natural' market share for the EC industry. 
A major finding is  that non-EC  shipbuilders appear to  have better contact with, and 
better understanding of the needs  of,  shipowners  - including EC owners.  If this 
position continues, then  the competitiveness  of the  European Community  industry 
will continue to decline. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  This report has been prepared for the  Commission of the European Communities by 
KPMG  Peat Marwick  in  association  with  First  Marine  International,  specialist 
shipbuilding industry consultants. 
1. 2  It sets out the content, findings and conclusions of a study to assess the factors which 
affect the  competitiveness of the  European  Community  shipyards, and  to  propose 
ways and means to enhance it in the context of the internal market.  The study was to 
cover only the shipbuilding yards as defined under Article 1 of the Council Directive 
on  aid to  shipbuilding (90/684/EEC),  ie those  involved in  the new  building  of sea 
going merchant ships of not less than 100 grt. 
Detailed terms of reference 
1. 3  The study brief issued by DGIII specifies that the study should evaluate inter alia: 
•  the role of production organisation; 
•  advantages and limits of series production; 
•  labour productivity (role of training); 
•  the importance of design and technology features; 
•  the importance of supplies. 
1.4  When making the assessments above, the study should give particular emphasis to: 
•  the  importance of co-operation and  sub-contracting  particularly as  regards 
production, marketing and  technology; 
•  the main differences of competitive levels between Community yards; 
•  the  comparison  with  the  situation  in  countries  outside  the  EC,  namely 
Finland,  Japan  and  Korea,  in  particular  as  far  as  the  cost structures  are 
concerned. 
1.5  Finally the study should present concrete proposals on ways and means of improving 
the general level of competitiveness of Community yards. 
Three key points as study guidelines 
1.6  The  approach  has been market-driven.  The  markets  and criteria for  success with 
small coasters or fishing vessels  are  very different from  those  for very large crude 
carriers (VLCCs) or cruise  liners.  Our approach  has recognised  this and  significant 
differences have been reflected in our recommendations. 
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1. 7  There  are  many  factors that  determine  competitiveness which was defined  as  'the 
ability to  win and  execute  shipbuilding  orders  (in open  competition)  and  stay  in 
business'.  The  study  has  therefore  had  a  broad  scope  and  covered  issues 
surrounding: 
•  market structures and accessibility; 
•  product strategy and innovation; 
•  shipyard effectiveness and efficiencies; 
•  the role of finance. 
1. 8  The study terms of reference focus  on improving the competitiveness of the whole 
European  Community industry  in  the  world market.  The  study therefore  has not 
covered issues of intra-Community competition or differences  in national industries 
except where relevant to the overall objective. 
Approach and methodology 
1. 9  There were three main phases in our approach to the study: 
•  Market analysis  of the focus  countries, ie  the European Community, Japan, 
Korea and Finland using published information sources. 
•  Detailed  comparative  data  gathering  on  performance  and  use  of  'best 
practice'  in  a  cross-section  of European  Community  yards  agreed  with 
national trade associations,  and  also significant competitors in international 
product  markets  in Korea,  Japan  and  Finland.  Discussions  were also  held 
with a range of shipowners and industry suppliers to integrate their views. 
•  Analysis  of  the  research  findings  and  the  development  of  options  for 
improving competitive performance. 
1. 10  Details of the  contacts made  and  best practice  assessment methodologies are  shown 
in the appendices to  this report. 
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2  Current market position and market share 
The Economic Importance of the Shipbuilding Sector 
2. 1  This section considers the economic significance of the shipbuilding sector in terms 
of employment,  output  and exports within  the overall economies of the  EC.  This 
places into context the direct value  of the shipbuilding industry although  it does not 
address the indirect impact of the industry through the impact on other sectors of the 
economy. 
The  table  below  summarises  employment  in  the  EC  shipyards with  comparable 
employment  figures  for  total  industry.  On  average,  across  the  EC  shipbuilding 
directly  accounts  for  less than half a percent of industrial employment.  However, 
within  Denmark  and  Greece  it  is  relatively significant at  over  1.32%  and  1.10% 
respectively. 
Employment in EC Shipyards 
Total  New  Total  %  of total 
employment  in  ship  building  industrial  shipbuilding 
Shipyards  only  employment  in  industrial 
[ 1991]  [1990]  employment 
Belgium  2594  2471  958000  0.27 
Denmark  8740  7280  662000  1.32 
France  7535  5388  5951000  0.13 
Gennany  53954  33940  10540000  0.51 
Great Britain  9191  6125  6722000  0.14 
Greece  7675  - 709000  1.1 
Ireland  - - 284000  -
Italy  17348  11714  5679000  0.31 
Netherlands  10600  3900  1567000  0.68 
Portugal  9885  3764  1355000  0.73 
Spain  16827  12954  3594000  0.47 
EC  12  144349  87536  38021000  0.4 
Sources:  AWES and Eurostat.  1989 figures for total industrial employment in 
Greece 
NB:  The  table  includes  only direct employment in  shipyards.  The  use  of sub-
contract labour is widespread, particularly in Italy, Netherlands and  Spain.  Based on 
our research  in these countries, inclusive figures  would  be 25%  to  60%  higher than 
shown above. 
2. 2  The following  table details the value of shipbuilding output and the value of exports. 
As  a percentage of gross domestic product for the whole EC,  the shipbuilding sector 
alone  accounts  for  0.16%.  The  share in GDP is highest in  Denmark  at 0.86%  and 
Spain at 0.44%.  Regarding  exports, the shipbuilding  sector accounts  for 0.26%  of 
total  EC  exports  although  some  of  this  will  be  intra-EC  trade.  Exports  are 
particularly significant for Spain (1.55%) and Germany (0.46%). 
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Total Output and Exports of EC Shipyards 
Total  GDP at  %share  Export  Total  %of 
value  m  market  of  GDP  value  of  exports  total 
ECU  prices  m  shipbuilding  m  ECU  exports 
[1991]  ECU  m  ECU  [1991] 
[1989]  [1991] 
Belgium  58  139000  0.04  24  102524  0.02 
Denmark  822  95100  0.86  - 26674  -
Fnmce  684  870300  0.08  248  200117  0.12 
Gennany  2082  1079900  0.19  1427  309237  0.46 
Great Britain  357  760300  0.05  - 169437  -
Greece  - 49200  - 26  17412  0.15 
Ireland  - 30800  - - 16833  -
Italy  1064  786500  0.14  - 147197  -
Netherlands  403  203200  0.2  196  110899  0.18 
Portugal  27  41100  0.07  16  21089  0.08 
Spain  1518  345200  0.44  1127  72666  1.55 
EC 12  7015  4406900  0.16  3064  1194085  0.26 
Sources:  AWES and Eurostat 
Production shares 
2.  3  The share of world ship production measured  in compensated gross tonnes (CGT) 
achieved by European Community (EC), Japanese and Korean shipyards since 1981 
is shown below: 
Production 
50 
40 
Market  30 
share 
%of 
CGT  20 
10 
0 
N  M  -.:::!"  V)  \0  r- 00  0'\  0 
00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  ~  0'\  0'\  0'\  0'\  0'\  0'\  0'\  0'\  - - - - - - - - -
-0- Japan 
~  European Community 
-£:r- South Korea 
Source:  European Commission statistics 
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2. 4  The key features of this are: 
•  the significant increase in the Korean market share from  an  average of 8.5% 
in the first part of the period to 14.5% in the second half; 
•  the fall  in the Japanese share from  41.7%  to  37.8%  in the latter part of the 
period; 
•  the relative stability of the EC share at around 23.2%. 
Market shares for new orders placed 
2. 5  The market shares for new orders placed each year since 1981  shows: 
New Orders 
60 
Market  50 
share 
%of 
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-o- Japan 
-o- European Community 
-b- South Korea 
2.6  The key  features  of this  chart are  clearly similar to the picture on production  but of 
particular note are: 
the growth in share, particularly since 1989, for Korea; 
•  the decline in the EC share from  1988  such that in  1991  Korea  for  the first 
time actually won more orders than the EC in terms of COT; 
•  the drop in Japanese share in 1991; 
•  the  consequent rise,  not shown  above,  in  the  share  of other  countries  to 
25.7%, the highest figure since 1981; 
•  the impact of the 'Sanko' deal on the Japanese share in the early 1980s. 
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Market shares by product groups 
2. 7  There  is  considerable  variation in  the  year to  year production of individual  ship 
types.  The chart below shows the  average share of production  within Korea, Japan, 
Finland  and  the EC,  by  ship type for the three year period  1989  - 1991  together 
with an  indication of trend.  For comparison  an analysis of their order book as  at 
January  1992 is shown alongside. 
%  share of CGT  %  share of CGT 
production  Trend  order book 
Shiptype  1989  - 1991  1989  -1991  _jan-92 
Gas carriers  6.6  Increasing  11.2 
VLCC  6.8  Static  14.8 
Other tankers  14.7  Static  20.6 
Bulkers  16.1  Static  12.3 
Containerships  12.7  Increasing  13.3 
Reefers  4.6  Decreasing  2.2 
Dry cargo  9.5  Static  4.4 
Passenger  10.7  Static  11 
Ro-Ros  3.2  Decreasing  2.6 
Fishing vessels  7.3  Decreasing  2.4 
Others  7.9  Increasing  5.2 
Source:  Lloyds database/KPMG calculations 
2. 8  The key features of this are: 
•  the significance of tankers  and gas carriers  in the order book,  46.6% of total 
CGT compared with 28.1% of production in 1989- 1991; 
•  the  apparent relative  decrease in order book in  dry  cargo  and  other ships. 
· However, it should  be  noted  that  these  two  markets tend  to  be both more  , 
local  in  nature  and  made  up  of smaller  ships  with  short  lead  times  on 
ordering; 
•  the  significant decline  in the  production  of fishing vessels during  the time 
period. 
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Shares by product sector 
2.9  The  market share by ship type achieved by  EC shipyards in the period  1989/91  is 
shown below, both for the  total world market and  of shipowners  based in the EC, 
Japan, Korea and Finland (the focus  countries). 
EC  share of focus  EC share of 
Shiotvoe  country  production  world  market 
Gas carrier  24  24 
VLCC  0  }  7 
Other tankers  16  } 
Bulkers  7  4 
Containerships  43  } 
Reefers  54  }  35 
Dry cargo  46  } 
Passenger  45  } 
Ro-Ros  48  }  43 
Others  42  } 
Total  30  23 
Sources:  Lloyds database/KPMG calculations 
CESA market share data:  Maritime Industries Forum papers 
2.10  The table above illustrates the comparatively low share in the tanker and  bulk carrier 
product markets.  The  comparison  with Far East and  other countries  is summarised 
below: 
World market share  % 
Ship  type  EC  Japan  Korea  Rest  of World 
Tankers and 
Bulkers  8  41  20  31 
Others  39  36  7  18 
Total  23  38  14  25 
Source:  Lloyds database/KPMG calculations 
The growth in the total Korean share has resulted from  particular success in tankers 
and bulk carriers, whereas the Japanese industry has a significant share in all markets. 
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Market shares and shipowner nationalities 
2.11  The  chart below shows the  nationality  of the  shipowner for all  ships  produced  in 
Korea, Japan, EC and Finland for the period 1989- 1991: 
Shh builder located in 
Korea 
Shipowner  Japan 
located in  EC 
Other 
Total 
Source: 
NB: 
Korea  Japan 
1219  65 
112  7417 
1118  1249 
2234  3782 
4683  12513 
Lloyds database/KPMG calculations 
units in terms of '000 CGT 
2.12  The key points arising are: 
EC 
-
5 
4655 
3012 
7672 
•  the relatively large size of the Japanese home market; 
Finland 
-
-
23 
889 
912 
Total 
1284 
7534 
7045 
9917 
25780 
•  the  relative  success  of Japanese  and  Korean  shipbuilders  to  meet  home 
demand  with 98% and  95% shares respectively.  Very  few orders are  placed 
outside the home country by these shipowners; 
•  in contrast 34% of EC shipowners orders are placed outside the EC. 
2.13  At  the  product  market  level,  there  appears  to  be  a  clear  and  understandable 
relationship between a large home market and relative success in other markets.  This 
is  also true  for  Korea with container ships  and bulkers  where home  based owners 
account for  50%  and  35%  of total Korean production respectively.  There are  two 
major exceptions to this:  Korea in  tankers  and Finland  in passenger ships, ie where 
the great majority of owners are not home based.  The reasons for this are discussed 
later in this report. 
Market share and specialisation 
2.14  It has been  argued,  however, that the EC industry  has  a particular specialism, and  a 
defensible  market niche,  in  added  value,  high  technology  ships.  Market  share 
figures by product market have been used to support this proposition.  Whilst there is 
an  element of truth  in this,  recent developments  suggest  that this  is not the whole 
picture.  For example: 
•  Harland  & Wolff have  a  significant labour  cost advantage  over Japan  in 
building bulk carriers and  are probably competitive with the Koreans; 
•  Odense have  secured the first non-EC  order in Europe  for  VLCCs since the 
1970s; 
•  B&W are currently successful with OBO carriers; 
•  a considerable proportion  of EC production is for  captain-owners requiring 
relatively simple ships. 
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2.15  Looking at the possible threats to such a position: 
•  the  Japanese  industry  is  clearly  targeting  the  added  value  sector  and 
particularly cruise vessels and gas carriers; 
•  the Koreans emphasise the need to upgrade  and have invested significantly in 
LNG developments; 
•  some  shipowners,  a  minority  as  yet,  suggest  ships  are  becoming  too 
sophisticated  for  effective operations  and  are  forecasting  a move  back to 
simpler products. 
2. 16  The  clear danger  with a niche strategy  is evidenced by  the  European  motor cycle 
industry  and many  others  where apparently defensible positions, at least apparent to 
those in the industry, existed only until the competition chose to focus  on the area 
and  develop  appropriate  products.  The  alternative  approach  is  to  target specific 
market  sectors  and  to  create  a  strong  competitive  position  to  win  share  from 
competition. 
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3  The European Community shipbuilding industry 
Basic structural features 
3.1  As  at January 1992, there were 204 shipyards in the EC with recorded order books. 
Distribution of yards by size of order book shows: 
Order book  in  %  or order 
Yards  '000  CGT  book 
Order book  28  4566  74 
100,000 + CGT 
20.  ()()() - 1  00,000  32  961  16 
CGT 
Under 20,000  144  648  10 
CGT 
Total  204  6175  100 
Source:  Lloyds database/KPMG calculations/ European Commission 
3.2  Within this total, there are three shipbuilding groups significant in overall production 
terms being Fincantieri, AESA and Bremer Vulkan.  Between them these groups have 
17  yards  (8%  of the total)  and  account for 31%  of the  EC order book  and  27% of 
1991  actual  production.  The remaining yards are broadly autonomous shipbuilding 
companies. 
3.3  Compared  with Japan and Korea, the industry is very fragmented.  On an individual 
yard  basis  the  Herfindahl  index,  as  defined  in  Appendix  6,  of  1.78%  is 
approximately  half that of Japan.  Of more  significance  is  the  index  based  on 
ownership groups  which at  3.83%  is about one third of that of Japan (12.83%)  and 
lower still  compared to  Finland and  South Korea.  The inference is  that the EC 
industry has less opportunity for economies of scale in its present form. 
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Ownership 
3.4  The  ownership of the European Community  industry is considerably more diverse 
than that in Japan, Korea or Finland.  About 89% of yards, and 55% of production is 
accounted  for  by  the  'specialist shipbuilder'  sector, that is those yards that are not 
owned by either shipowners or engineering groups.  The proportion of the industry 
that is linked to  large, diversified engineering groups  is very small in comparison to 
Japan.  Approximately 10%  of yards, accounting  for around 25%  of production are 
in organisations with a majority state ownership. 
%  of 1991 
%  of yards  production 
Independent build~  78  22 
Shipbuilding groups  11  33 
Shipowner  5  22 
Small engineering group  4  13 
Large engineering group  2  10 
Source:  KPMG estimates based on field visits 
3.5  Recent trends would indicate a degree of change and  include: 
•  more involvement by shipowners, for example Kvaemer, Olsen, Cispargas; 
moves towards more and  bigger groupings, for example  Bremer Vulkan and 
Leroux et Lotz; 
reduction  in direct state ownership, for example re-privatisation in the Greek 
industry and  rationalisation in Fincantieri. 
Non-ownership based co-operation 
3. 6  In  addition  to  the  formalised ownership  based structures,  there  are also  many less 
formal  initiatives amongst yards targeted  at gaining economies of scale and building 
critical mass.  Amongst these are: 
•  the E3 tanker design project; 
•  the AESA/Fincantieri purchasing initiative; 
•  the N5 and Centraal Staal initiatives in the Netherlands; 
•  the  joint marketing  and  production  ventures  of the  German containership 
builders; 
the Danish consumables purchasing organisation. 
Home market influences 
3.7  The  EC  shipowners who  have  built  in  the  focus  countries  during  1989  - 1991 
accounted  for 21% of total world deliveries.  EC based demand is particularly strong 
in passenger vessels, dry cargo ships and containerships. 
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3. 8  EC  shipbuilders  achieve  a  66%  share  of EC  based  shipowner  demand.  This 
'leakage' of 34%  of the home market compares  with figures  of 2%  for Japan and 
5%  for  Korea.  This  relative weakness  is  concentrated  in the tanker  and  bulker 
product markets  where EC shipyards in total are only the third largest builder for EC 
shipowners, behind both Japan  and Korea.  In contrast, the EC industry has a higher 
share of the world market in both reefers and other vessels in comparison to the size 
of the home market. 
EC  shipbuilders market share 
At  or  below  Above 
avera2e  avera2e 
Above  Gas carriers  Passenger 
Relative size of  average  Dry cargo 
rT9% 
Containers 
rT6%  EC shipowner  Ro-Ros 
demand 
At  or  below  Tankers  Reefers 
avera2e  Bulkers  r28% Others  li7% 
Source:  Lloyds database 
NB:  % figures are of EC shipowner demand 
Comparative performance 
3. 9  Based  on  our visit programme  to  40 of the  European Community  yards,  it would 
seem that EC yards can be grouped into three clusters on general characteristics, that 
is  an above average,  an average and  a below average  group.  Details  are shown in 
Appendices 3 and 4.  These general characteristics are made up of: 
•  use of 'best practice' in each of the main functional areas of the business; 
•  performance  measures including indicated profitability,  forward order book, 
build  cycle time,  man hours  per CGT  output  and  man hours per tonne of 
steel. 
3. 10  This categorisation would appear to  be independent of the  yard size, yard ownership 
or  type  of product  although  there  are  distinctions  that have  to  be  incorporated.  , 
However, there is  a difference, not in performance but in how  that performance is 
achieved, between yards which are  competing internationally  and  tend  to  be larger 
ship orientated  and,  those which compete  more  on an  intra-European  basis.  The 
broad characteristics of the cluster groups are: 
Performance  Use  of best practice 
measures  International yards  Smaller  vards 
EC above average  150  117  88 
EC average  105  96  71 
EC below average  65  88  61 
NB:  Average  for  all  main  international  yards  indexed  at  100.  See  details 
Appendix 3 and 4. 
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The differences between the two types of yards can be summarised as below. 
Smaller yards typically: 
•  build pre-dominantly for EC based owners; 
•  cite the main competitors as other EC shipbuilders; 
•  build mainly dry cargo ships, small tankers, fishing and service vessels; 
have low overhead organisation structures. 
International yards typically: 
•  have a wider target group of owners; 
claim strong competition from  Japanese and Korean builders as well as other 
Europeans; 
• 
• 
build  containerships,  tankers,  bulk carriers,  passenger  vessels, reefers  and 
dredgers; 
have a higher absolute capability in non-direct production activities . 
3. 11  Looking  at best practice by  functional  area, there  are significant differences in all 
areas between the above and below average groups. 
International  Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
yards  Manaeement Marketine Purchasine  Resource~ Technical Plan  nine Production 
EC  above  134  122  118  115  110  115  107 
average 
EC  average  98  89  96  108  97  84  100 
EC  below  75  85  86  81  97  100  89 
averaee 
Smaller  Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
yards  Mana~ement Marketine Purchasine Resource~ Technical Plannin2 Production 
EC  above  111  94  103  78  79  80  79 
average 
EC  average  78  70  87  63  70  63  72 
EC  below  45  63  65  50  72  63  71 
averaee 
Although the  ratings for smaller yards are generally at a lower level than those for 
the  international  yards,  the  pattern  of differences  between  the  above  and  below 
average  yards  are similar.  Given the tenns of reference  of the study, the rest of this 
section has focused on the international yards. 
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3. 12  Looking  at overall performance and  use of best practice by type of yard ownership, 
there would appear to  be no major or significant differences. 
Type  of  yard  Performance  Overall  rating  on 
ownership  measure  use  of  best _])_ractlce 
Independent  104  99 
Shipowner  101  101 
Shipbuilding  group  93  99 
En2ineerin2  2roup  102  96 
NB:  Average  for  all  main  international  yards  indexed  at  100.  See  details  in 
Appendix 3 and 4. 
Ownership  has  been  defined  by  the  largest  immediate  shareholder  and  not 
necessarily the ultimate owner. 
3. 13  Taking the analysis to the next level and looking at best practice by  functional area, 
there are some differences between the different types of ownership. 
Ownership  Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
type  Mana2ement Marketin2 Purchasin2 Resource.!i Technical Plannin2 Production 
Independent  Ill  107  100  83  95  96  95 
Shipowner  100  100  103  98  105  105  99 
Shipbuilding 
group  90  89  96  102  108  115  103 
Engineering 
e-roup  97  86  96  109  95  89  99' 
The features of this analysis are: 
•  shipyards  owned by shipowners are in line  with European norms across all 
areas; 
•  independent  yards  have  higher  ratings  on  strategy  and  management  and 
marketing criteria; 
•  independent  yards  have  comparatively  low  ratings  on  human  resource 
factors; 
• 
there  would  appear  to  be  few  differences  on  purchasing  or production 
criteria; 
shipbuilding  groups  have  higher  ratings  and  higher  use  of advanced 
technology  in design/technical  areas  and  planning  for  production.  This is 
particularly the case for those which are part of state owned groups. 
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3. 14  Comparing the international EC average yards with those in the other focus countries 
shows a pattern of comparative strengths and weaknesses summarised as: 
than Japan  than  Korea  than  Finland 
EC average yards are: 
. significantly better on  purchasing  human resources 
.  about the same on  design/technical  strategy  strategy 
design/technical  purchasing 
planning 
. significantly worse on  strategy  marketing  marketing 
marketing  human resources  design/technical 
purchasing  production  planning 
human resources  production 
planning 
production 
3.15  In comparison, EC above average yards are relatively strong: 
than Japan  than  Korea  than  Finland 
EC above average yards are: 
•  significantly better on  strategy  strategy  strategy 
marketing  purchasing  purchasing 
design/technical  design/technical  human resources 
planning 
. about the same on  purchasing  marketing  marketing 
human resources  human resources  planning 
planning  production  production 
production 
. significantly worse on  design/technical 
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Strategy and management issues  (EC above average 
(EC average 
(EC below average 
134) 
98) 
75) 
3.16  The broad differences between the cluster groups can be summarised as: 
Main  international  <---------> Smaller  yards 
yards 
EC above average  Highly focussed  Single product 
Narrow product range  Niche dominators 
High output, short cycle  Highly focussed 
UseofAMT  Low overhe4d 
ECaverage  High overhead  Limited product range 
but flexible 
EC below average  High overhead  Multi-product 
Often over-manned  Long cycle times 
Unclear strategy (flexible)  Long berth times 
Lon11:cvcle  Basic technology 
3. 17  The key  between the cluster groups is  in  the degree of focus  in the company on a 
specific target  market.  Where  there  is  a high degree  of focus  shipyards  achieve 
competitive output performance and  report relatively strong order books.  Where the 
strategy  is expressed  in terms  of multi-product  focus,  or flexibility  within a size 
range,  performance characteristics tend  to be  significantly lower.  This focus clearly 
links  through to  clarity  of management  objectives and  actions in each functional 
area.  Where there was a strong strategic focus, management tasks at lower levels were 
clear with strong communication between departments.  This tended  not  to  be  the 
case in the below average group. 
3.18  It would appear that yards with clear strategies are also more profitable.  Many yards 
have a range  of activities including naval work, repair and  industrial manufacturing , 
which share  a number of resources.  Based on  Chief Executive comments  on the 
current levels of profitability on merchant  new building activity, the picture shows: 
%  reportinl current profitabilit 
"Satisfactory"  "Difficult" "Losses"  Total 
EC above average  76  15  9  100 
EC average  8  62  30  100 
EC below average  8  15  77  100 
Review of financial  information where made  available confirmed this general picture. 
Care  should  be  taken  on  interpreting  the  terms  used  by  Chief  Executives,  eg 
'satisfactory'.  It  was  frequently  pointed  out,  and  confirmed  by  available 
information,  that  the  general  level  of profitability  in  the  industry  is  low  in 
comparison to similar industrial sectors. 
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There  would  appear  to  be  no  clear differences  in  performance  on  merchant ship 
building between yards with different ownership structures.  However, those that were 
part of larger groupings  were more heavily  profit driven and  saw  themselves as in 
'competition'  with other companies  in  their  groups  - whether  or not  they  were 
shipbuilders - and tended to be targeting higher levels of return on investment. 
Marketing issues  (EC above average 
(EC average 
(EC below average 
122) 
89) 
85) 
3.19  The characteristics that separated the above average group tend to  be: 
•  a clearly defined target shipowner segment; 
•  a pro-active marketing  approach  featuring  regular contact direct with target 
owners; 
•  a sales and  marketing resource  adequate  for the programme.  In most cases 
this equated to 2.5 to 7.5% of the total employees, a level broadly in line with 
Korean and Japanese levels; 
a view of, and supporting systems for,  after sales service as  a potential sales 
opportunity and not as  a delayed production cost; 
•  a product development programme  targeted at the future  needs of the focus 
group of shipowners. 
Purchasing  (EC above average 
(EC average 
(EC below average 
118) 
96) 
86) 
3.20  Yards with above average ratings on purchasing tend to have a more strategic view of 
purchasing  and  are  moving towards  a philosophy of partnership or co-production 
with suppliers.  Relationships  with a limited number  of suppliers in  each  area are 
being  developed with early involvement in the pre-negotiation  stages for quotations. 
This process is  claimed by  most yards to  produce  a one-off saving of 10/15%.  In a 
more  limited  number  of  cases,  the  relationship  has  developed  to  partnership 
agreements which include price deflators of up to  3%  a year. 
3.21  Critical mass is  seen to  be a key issue  by the majority of shipyards because of the 
relatively small size of shipyard  purchase needs  both  against the suppliers of major 
materials  such  as  steel  and  main  engines,  and  in  comparison  with  the  main 
international  competitors.  A number  of initiatives have been developed to  respond 
to this including: 
•  centralised purchasing in the shipbuilding groups, for example within AESA, 
Leroux et Lotz and Fincantieri; 
•  possible buying synergies within the N5  Dutch grouping; 
•  the studies on co-ordinated purchasing within the E3  grouping; 
•  the ambitions of AESA and Fincantieri to co-operate in this area. 
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3.22  However, these by  themselves are  claimed by  the shipyards  not to  be  enough  and 
they are critical of the European marine equipment industry as  a constraint on their 
business in terms of: 
the national orientation of suppliers and  their standards  and the difficulty in 
operating cross-borders; 
the fragmentation of the supply base (described as  'artisan not industrial'); 
•  the  lack  of commitment  of suppliers  to  the  industry  having  short-term 
horizons and being investment averse. 
3.23  There is  no  established pattern in  the  use  of sub-contracting  as  a manufacturing 
strategy.  Incidence  is  fairly evenly spread across  a range from  0%  of direct man 
hours up to  about 50%  but tends to be higher in the Netherlands,  Italy  and  Spain 
which have well developed sub-contract infrastructures.  A number of yards see sub-
contract as  a means of improving productivity but are in relatively isolated areas with 
no infrastructure support. 
3. 24  From  our analysis, there is no overall direct relationship between the  total amount of 
sub-contract  activity and performance measures.  However, there would appear to be 
a  relationship depending on the nature of the  sub-contract activity.  There are two 
basic models for sub-contracting in European yards: 
•  firstly,  the  contracting out of discrete blocks of work  which tend  to  have 
utilisation  peaks  during  the  shipbuilding  period,  for  example  painting, 
cabling, pipework; 
•  secondly,  the  structural  under  staffing  of all  departments  (except sales, 
purchasing and production planning) so that a significant proportion of each 
department's  workload is  sub-contracted at  all  times  (including design and 
technical), and at peak times the majority is contracted out. 
Within EC yards  the  second  model  is  associated with high output levels  and  short 
cycle  building  but tends  to  be limited to the  smaller yards.  In  many ways  it has 
parallels  with the  yard  sub-contract system  in Japan  which gives  a high  degree  of 
production flexibility with a limited fixed cost exposure. 
Human resources issues  (EC above average  115) 
(EC average  108) 
(EC below average  81) 
3.25  The major differences between the  above and below average yards are in four key 
areas: 
the emphasis on upgrading skills; 
•  the effort to  restructure the  workforce through recruitment; 
•  the degree of employee empowerment; 
•  multi-skilling and re-skilling. 
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3.26  Above  average yards tend  to have clear policy objectives of upgrading and  multi-
skilling both indirect and direct workforces at  all levels.  Significant and  continuous 
training  programmes  have  been  implemented  using  both  internal  and  external 
resources.  In some cases these have  been tied into continuous  assessment processes 
and  salary enhancement schemes.  Few yards were able to measure the direct benefit 
of multi-skilling but where this was possible the indication was for productivity gains 
of around 3%  a year. 
3.27  Most  yards  in  the  central  and  northern  regions  of the  community have  now  re-
introduced  direct workforce recruitment schemes after a period of static or declining 
employment  numbers.  In the  majority of cases  yards  are  experiencing significant 
difficulty  in recruiting  at  the right  quality  level which is  put down  to  the relative 
unattractiveness of shipbuilding  compared to  aerospace  for example.  A number of 
yards,  particularly  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  have  in  place  liaison  and 
sponsorship  programmes  with  local  schools  and  technical  colleges  to  try  and 
improve both the quality and quantity of recruits. 
3.28  Within most of the  EC  yards  there  is  some  form  of employee  representation  in 
decision making either through workers councils or  board representation.  The most 
extreme expression of employee empowerment was seen in a Dutch yard  which has 
the  workforce  organised  into  work  groups  of between  12  - 20  people  by  area. 
Leadership is by a group representative who is rotated on a regular basis.  The work 
group is responsible for its own work planning within the overall masterplan and also 
for  work quality and transfer of work to the  next group.  The system is still evolving 
in  the  yard  but  internal  yard  performance  measures  indicate  a  10%  labour 
productivity  increase  since  the  system  was  started  in  1990.  In  assessing  the 
importance  of a 10%  increase, it should be  remembered that this yard  was  already 
one of the highest output per worker yards with levels comparable with the Japanese. 
3.29  Labour costs vary significantly both from  country  to  country  and in different yards 
within countries.  Broadly there  are three groups and  these and the comparison with 
Japan, Korea and Finland are shown below. 
Hourly costs  in  ECU 
Avera2e  Minimum  Maximum  EC  Countries  Other 
Relatively high  19.60  17.58  22.95  Gennany  Japan (19.05) 
labour costs  Belgium 
Average labour  17.50  13.38  20.27  Spain  Finland (18.00) 
costs  Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Relatively low  8.80  4.82  12.05  UK  Korea (8.35) 
labour costs  Greece 
Portugal 
Source:  Yard visit programme 
NB:  Labour costs include national social benefit costs 
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Based on infonnation in the TecnEcon report, employee related costs make up about 
30% of total shipyard costs.  The existence of stable, relatively low labour cost areas 
within the  Community,  for  example  the  UK,  does  provide  some  yards  with the 
opportunity  to compete  strongly with  similar cost areas such  as  Korea,  in product 
sectors where the EC has a comparatively low market share, for example large bulker 
carriers. 
3. 30  The average  age of the workforce in EC yards  is  around  42, which is slightly below 
the indicated figure  for Japan of 44, but significantly more than the Korean figure of 
37.  The  average would  appear to  be higher in France, Spain and  Portugal at about 
44/45  than in other European Community  countries which have a figure  of about 
39/40.  Whilst the yards in general believe  an average of 35  would  lead to  higher 
efficiencies,  the  problem  is  seen  to  be  manageable  particularly  given  recent 
developments  in early retirement provisions, in for example Italy  and Netherlands. 
In France the  situation is different and  yards see a significant short tenn problem in 
managing  the retirement process both because of the scale involved and the fact that 
there is a significant disabled element. 
3. 31  In Spain and Portugal the ability to  restructure the workforce  is more limited because 
of differing  social  policies.  Indications  from  yards  show  30  - 40%  structural 
overmanning  in some  yards.  Whilst short term relief is  available  through social 
systems, this feature is  a significant constraint on the overall competitiveness of the 
yards. 
Design/technical issues  (EC above average 
(EC average 
(EC below average 
110) 
97) 
97) 
3.32  There  was  a very wide variation  in  design  capability and  experience  and  scale of 
technical offices (from less than ten staff to  over five  hundred)  according  to  size of 
yard  and  size  and  type  of ship  in  the  product  range.  Little  design work  was 
subcontracted and this was mainly a feature of some of the smaller yards. 
3. 3  3  Many  yards have invested massively in CAD/CAM systems and equipment.  In the ' 
above average yards, implementation has been carefully thought out and has resulted 
in improved productivity in the  technical offices and  a significant improvement in 
the quality, content and consistency  of outputs  and an  increased ability to  cope with 
ever shorter lead times.  A feature  of some of the  average, and most of the below 
average rated yards, has been difficulty in effective implementation of CAD systems 
which has  resulted  in the  pencil  being  replaced  by  the  computer  but  at no  great 
advantage. 
3. 34  Again, there was found  to be a wide variation in the quality of technical information 
for  shopfloor purposes.  Some  yards  still  produce large  area  drawings  requiring 
significant  interpretive  skills on  the  shopfloor,  whereas  the  above  average  yards 
(excepting  some  of the  smaller ones)  produce  specific workstation information in 
easily  understandable  form  and  increasingly  have  full  CAD/CAM generation  of 
manufacturing infonnation with DNC links. 
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3.35  Yards  with above average  ratings  in the  design/technical area  enjoyed  good  co-
operation  and  exchange of information between departments  which has helped to 
achieve production-kindly features in the detailed design of their products.  Whereas, 
in many of the below average yards there tended to be strict departmental boundaries 
with  rather  poor  liaison  with planning  and  production  and  poor  feedback  on 
problem areas. 
Planning issues  (EC above average 
(EC average 
(EC below average 
115) 
84) 
100) 
3. 36  The above average rated yards had  decentralised multi-level planning systems with 
clearly defined outputs at each level.  At the detailed/short term level (except in some 
of the small yards) there was a work package approach to organisation of  work (zone 
by stage by type of work) for planning, control and follow-up. 
3.37  Some  of the average  and  below average yards  have attempted to  follow  the work 
package  approach  but  without great  success  and  had  over-centralised  planning. 
Others planned by activities which were long in elapsed time and involved large trade 
based  packages of work which gave difficulties in monitoring  and  control because 
problems  were discovered too late for remedial action.  In the lower output, smaller 
yards,  sophisticated  planning  systems  cannot be justified,  and  an  activity  based 
approach to  planning is satisfactory for control purposes. 
3.38  The  yards  rated  above  average  in  planning  produce  formal  Build  Strategy 
documentation  for all contracts reflecting a well planned and  production engineered 
product.  The Build Strategy was used as a means of implementing new methods and 
technology  on each  subsequent contract  consistent .with  the  long  term  company 
policy  of continuous improvement.  These companies  carefully  monitored  their 
shipbuilding  performance  and  productivity  and  very  often  published  this 
information within the shipyard together with targets to be achieved. 
3. 39  The above average yards  gave very high priority to  effective computerised material 
control  systems and to  the pre-production marshalling  of kits of parts.  They also 
have a more disciplined and positive attitude to achieving target dates and keeping to 
budgets. 
Production issues  (EC above average 
(EC average 
(EC below average 
107) 
100) 
89) 
3.40  The yards with above average productivity were achieving short build cycles (ie short 
dock/berth  time  and  short  outfit  quay  time).  This  was  a  consequence  of their 
adopting  the best block breakdown,  build  sequence  and  outfitting philosophy  to 
achieve the objective of maximising construction facility utilisation.  For most yards, 
there is a clear correlation between productivity and cycle time. 
3.41  The above average rated yards  had  adopted  and  implemented workstation concepts 
and had process flows clearly defined. 
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3.42  There  was a wide variation in outfitting  philosophy.  The  better yards  carried out 
outfitting  activities at  the earliest  sensible time  so  that  steel and  outfit  work was 
overlapped to reduce cycle time, and  outfitting and painting was  done at the stage of 
production which minimised outfitting man hours.  Some of the below average yards 
are  still outfitting, to  a greater or lesser extent,  in the traditional,  piece  by piece, 
sequential way (ie late in the build cycle after most steelwork is completed). 
3.43  EC yards  in general  are  gradually realising  the  importance of achieving  the right 
quality  first time and the avoidance of rework.  To this end, the above average yards 
are  giving very high priority to establishing procedures for accuracy  control in both 
steel and outfit work in order to  reduce man  hours at each sequential stage of work. 
In parallel with this, the better yards are  systematically making efforts to  design out 
and organise out needless work (eg staging, overhead working, fairing, rework). 
Investment trends 
3 .44  Some  yards have invested almost nothing during the  shipbuilding recession of the 
1980s and  have done little more than maintain their existing facilities and equipment 
and  buy  the  occasional  item  of new  equipment.  Some  have  made  piecemeal 
investments,  often  driven by  expediency  rather than  by  careful  planning  for  the 
needs of the  future.  Others have continued  to  invest in a systematic way consistent 
with  their long term  objectives.  Very,  very  few  have  yet  invested  seriously  in 
automation  and  robotics  although  a  number of yards  have  a token  robot  or two 
under development or working on minor steelwork. 
3.45  Overall, the EC shipbuilding industry  has invested neither significantly more  or less 
than  its  Japanese  and  Korean  counterparts  on  shipyard facilities,  equipment  and 
systems. 
3 .46  A number of large  and  medium  size yards now have plans for major investment in 
new  technology  - mechanisation,  automation,  protection from  weather, operating 
systems etc.  There is  a clear realisation in some yards  that  although much can be 
achieved  from  low  cost  improvements  in,  for  example,  planning,  organisation of 
work,  production engineering,  there  is  a need  for  capital investment to  achieve  a  , 
significant  step  forward  in  output  and  productivity  to  have  any  chance  of being 
competitive in the future. 
3.4  7  However, there are  yards planning very  significant investments in this  area who have 
not  yet  properly  addressed  the  issues  of planning,  organisation  of work  and 
production engineering.  Without the  basic philosophy in place it is  less likely that 
the investment will produce  a return.  A situation similar to  that in some  yards with 
CAD/CAM is very possible (see section 3.31 ). 
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4  The Japanese shipbuilding industry 
Basic structural features 
4.1  The  Japanese  shipbuilding industry  is  highly  concentrated.  Recent developments, 
for example the partnership agreement between Tsuneishi and  NKK and the closer 
alliance  between  Kawasaki  and  Shin Kurishima  are  evidence  that  the  process is 
continuing.  Whilst on a yard  by yard basis the Herfindahl index of concentration is 
low, calculating on the basis of shipbuilding groups the  index rises to  12.83%.  This 
is about three times as  high as  the EC industry figure,  and  is high relative to other 
industries that have been studied. 
4.2  There  are  seven  major  groupings  of shipyards  which  account  for  92%  of the 
Japanese  order book  as  at  January  1992 and  have  40 yards  with  orders  between 
them.  Each grouping is  led by a  shipbuilding division of one  of the seven major 
heavy industry groups of companies. 
4.3  The relative size of the Japanese groupings, measured by size of order book is shown 
below, together with comparisons with the major building groups in Korea and the 
EC. 
~Japan  Korea  EC 
1 Mitsubishi  1871 
2  Hyundai  1618 
3  NKK  1223 
4  Kawasaki  1189 
5  Daewoo  959 
6  Fincantieri  853 
7  Sumitomo  763 
8  Hitachi  747 
9llll  721 
10  Mitsui  591 
11  Samsung  590 
12  AESA  576 
13  Bremer Vulkan  507 
Source:  Lloyds database and European Commission 
NB:  Japanese yards traditionally work with shorter order books than other 
countries.  Figures are  in '000 CGT 
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4.4  In total there were  104 Japanese shipyards with order books as  at January  1992 of 
which half are  small yards primarily  building fishing  boats and  service vessels for 
domestic owners.  The distribution by size of order book shows: 
Order book  in  %of order 
Yards  '000  CGT  book 
Order book  26  6619  86 
100,000 + CGT 
20  ,000 - 1  00,000  18  783  10 
CGT 
Under 20,000 CGT  60  281  4 
Total  104  7683  100 
4.5  The seven major groups are further consolidated into two unions of which the largest 
is  the Kawasaki/NKK/Hitachi/Sumitomo union,  accounting for 51%  of the  industry 
order book. 
4.6  The shipyard groups  broadly  act as  strategic business units with loose bonds  which 
include: 
direct  shareholdings:  for  example  Mitsui  Engineering  and  Shipbuilding 
have a 30% holding in Shikoku, Tsuneishi have  100% of Hashihama; 
•  a  common  bank providing  financing:  for  example  the  Sanwa bank is  a 
common element in the Hitachi group; 
•  fonnal  contracts of support on technical and  production issues:  for example 
those between Shin Kurishima and Kawasaki; 
•  co-operation agreements:  for example between NKK and Tsuneishi. 
4.  7  There  are also many types of interchange between the groups  at different levels, for 
example: 
•  the NKK/Kawasaki joint design project for VLCCs; 
•  the technical liaison between Namura (part of Hitachi) and Mitsubishi; 
•  the  cross-shareholdings  between  groups.  As  illustration,  Sumitomo, 
Mitsubishi  and Mitsui Trusts have 10%  of Kawasaki Heavy Industries; Mitsui 
and  Sumitomo  Trusts  about  5%  of Mitsubishi  HI;  and  Sumitomo  and 
Mitsubishi Trusts about 5% of Mitsui E&S; 
•  the marketing  and  production link-up  between IHI  and  Sumitomo on LNG 
carriers using IHI 's prismatic gas system; 
•  the  NKK-Hitachi  technical agreement for  building LNG carriers  using the 
Technigaz system. 
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4. 8  To  a far  greater extent than in  Europe,  Japanese  shipyards are  members  of broad 
based  heavy  industry  groups  with  a  wide  range  of skills and  technology  in,  for 
example, nuclear engineering, construction and process plant development which are 
available  for  transfer to  the shipbuilding companies.  In our visit to Mitsubishi we 
were  shown  welding  techniques  which  had  been  developed  in  the  nuclear 
engineering division. 
4.9  In addition, the industry is vertically integrated to a great extent through companies' 
membership  of a banking  group which thereby  links shipowners, builders, suppliers 
and  finance  houses.  For example, N  avix  Line shares  the  same bank  as  Hitachi 
(Sanwa)  and a  high proportion  of orders  are  placed with that yard.  However, the 
arrangement  is  not exclusive because of other influences:  for example, Mitsubishi 
Trust is a direct shareholder in N  avix. 
4.10  This  vertical  integration  is  further  strengthened  by  cross-shareholdings  between 
shipbuilders  and suppliers:  as  examples Nippon Steel has  7.5% of Sasebo, Kawasaki 
Steel a direct holding in Kawasaki Heavy Engineering. 
4.11  An  overall level  of co-ordination  is  given  to  the  industry  by  the  Ministry  of 
Transport  and  the  governmental  agencies;  the  Ship  Research  Institute  and  the 
Association for  Structural  Improvement  of the  Shipbuilding  Industry.  The MOT 
provides a system for clear signalling of preferred directions of development and  can 
have an element of direct control through management of research funding. 
4.12  The  Japanese  way  of organising  the  shipbuilding  industry  has  a  number  of 
significant competitive advantages compared with that operating within the European 
Community.  These include: 
•  preferred access to the Japanese shipowner market; 
•  fast technology  and  best practice transfer across the industry.  Our research 
found  greater uniformity both  in performance and  use of best practice than 
in European Community yards; 
•  purchasing  advantages  through  greater  critical  mass.  In  general  group 
shipyards  channel  purchasing  of  larger  items  through  the  lead  yard.  , 
Combined  with the point that a number of suppliers operate within the same 
group,  it  is  probable  that  the  Japanese  industry  has  an  equipment  and 
materials cost advantage over EC competitors; 
•  increased  marketing  resources.  Group  lead  shipyards  provide  additional 
marketing  support  for  members  of the  group  and  are  in  tum,  through 
linkage through the banking group, supported by  the major Japanese trading 
companies.  For example, Mitsubishi HI  are building LNG tankers for  a gas 
field  development project brokered by  Mitsubishi  Corporation and  funded, 
in part, by Mitsubishi Bank; 
•  technology  transfer  from  parallel  industries.  As  an  example Kawasaki 
Robotics (part of KHI)  are  introducing a robotic steel marking and  cutting 
line  into  Kawasaki  Sakaide  using  information  from  previous  work  with 
Kawasaki Steel; 
•  uniform  Government signalling.  The  Ministry  of Transport is  the  policy 
making  body and  the industry is  therefore clear on broad  directions and the 
nature and  funding  of further research and  development. 
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Home market influences 
4.13  Japan  has a large domestic shipowner demand,  accounting  for 23%  of total world 
production  in 1989/91.  Of this, in excess of 98% was built by Japanese shipbuilders 
and  home  demand  therefore  accounted  for  about  59%  of their total  production. 
Japanese owners have a large presence in all markets. 
4.14  Shipowners are closely linked to  the shipbuilding groups: 
through membership of the same banking group, for example Navix through 
Sanwa to Hitachi, Mitsui OSK to Mitsui E&S, K-Line to Kawasaki; 
•  through  direct  shareholding,  for  example  the  Mitsui  OSK  30%  stake  in 
Shikoku  Dockyard. 
4. 15  From  our discussions  with Japanese owners, it was clear that they had  a short list of 
three  or four  Japanese  yards  who  had  favoured  supplier  status  based on interest 
group  linkages,  with  the  final  choice  heavily  dependent  upon  availability  of 
production  capacity.  Japanese  yards  outside  the  banking/family  group  were  not 
considered.  Korean yards  were always reviewed but  needed  a  price  advantage of 
15/20%  for  serious  consideration.  European  yards were  dismissed on grounds  of 
inferior quality, delivery unreliability, exchange rate risk and language problems. 
4.16  The  'build  at  home'  tendency  is  reinforced  by  the  home  credit  schemes  for 
domestic shipowners.  We understand there are three versions: 
•  for foreign  flagged  vessels 50% of the finance  is provided by the group bank 
and 50% by the import/export bank on OECD tenns; 
•  for  Japanese  flagged  vessels,  the  group  bank  provides  50%  and  the 
Development  Bank  50%  at  advantageous  rates.  To  qualify  for this  the 
shipowner has  to  submit a  full  feasibility  study  for  the  building  project. 
Especially favourable tenns have been available recently for LNG vessels; 
•  for  Japanese coastal shipping companies, a co-ownership scheme run  by the 
Maritime Credit Corporation  to  support in particular ferries  and  passenger 
vessels. 
4. 17  Japanese owners interviewed stated that a Development Bank funding  condition had 
always  been that the vessel was  Japanese  built,  but recent  announcements  by  the 
Government have indicated that this no longer applies. 
4. 18  A  further  feature  of the  Japanese  shipowning  industry  is  the  existence of direct 
government subsidy to  shipping companies.  For example, in  1989, 37  ocean going 
shipping companies were receiving subsidy. 
4. 19  As  with shipbuilding the Ministry of Transport has  a significant co-ordinating and 
direction  setting role  in shipping, as  for  example  in the  continuing programme  to 
promote  passenger cruising services through the initiatives of the 'sub-committee on 
ocean going  passenger boats'  within the  General  Affairs  Committee of the  Council 
for Transport Policy. 
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4.20  From  the  shipbuilding  point  of view,  the  structure  of the  shipowning  industry 
provides significant advantages in terms of: 
•  a 'secured' base load of demand; 
•  the  opportunity  for early market entry, eg the LNG sector, with a build-up of 
experience which can be used in competing in the non-Japanese market. 
Comparative performance 
4.21  In total, the Japanese shipbuilding industry had a 38.4% share of the world market in 
1991  on a production basis, and  37.4% on a new orders basis.  Particular areas of 
strength are tankers  and bulkers, but there is  a strong market presence in all areas as 
shown below: 
%  or sector 
%  or world  sales  to 
market  domestic  owners 
Gas carriers  66  53 
Tankers  38  50 
Bulkers  38  45 
Container/dry cargo  30  64 
Others  41  79 
Total  38  59 
Source:  Lloyds database/CESA 
4. 22  A  key  finding  of our  investigations  in  the  Japanese  shipyards  visited  was  the 
generally  uniform picture across  both output performance and  use  of best practices. 
This  we  believe is  a result of the  integrated group  structure  and  mechanisms  for 
technology transfer.  At the  overall level, performance was  significantly better than 
the EC average. 
Output  Use  of  best 
performance  practice 
200  Japan  111 
105  EC average group  96 
Source:  Shipyard visit programme 
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4.23  Looking  at best practice  by  function  against the  EC  average  group  of shipyards, 
Japanese ratings were significantly higher than Europe in all areas except for design 
and technical factors. 
Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
Management Marketing Purchasing  Resources  frechnical  Planning Production 
EC  average  98  89  96  108  97  84  100 
group 
Japanese  116  109  118  115  97  113  107 
!yards 
Source:  Shipyard visit programme 
Strategy  /Management issues (Japan 116, EC average group 98) 
4.24  At each of the  yards  visited,  which  were  drawn  from  four  of the  seven  major 
groupings,  we were given the same view of the priorities facing the Japanese industry. 
In  summary the  objectives were expressed as  'to maintain competitive  position, to 
overcome the shortage of people and to  improve the attractiveness of the industry'. 
4.25  There was also a common view of the route to achieve these objectives which had two 
major themes: 
•  programmes  to make shipbuilding safer, cleaner and  easier, a counter to  the 
industry image  as  a 3K industry (in English the  3Ds - "dirty, difficult and 
dangerous").  Each yard  had programmes  which  were being implemented 
on: 
•  the improvement of working conditions; 
environmental improvement 
•  mechanisation and  automation 
productivity  improvement  with declared  objectives of reducing  man-hours 
per unit output by  50% by the year 2000. 
4.26  At the individual yard level there is a very clear product market focus  which has been 
determined  both by the nature of the physical facilities and the role of the shipyard 
within the total group product portfolio.  It would  seem  that a strategic objective of 
six of the seven groups is to be able to offer a full range of products to owners.  The 
position of IHI on this issue would still seem to  be undecided.  Within this, yards are 
becoming increasingly focussed.  For example: 
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4.27  In  terms  of competition,  the  major threat  is  seen in  all  cases as  being  from  other 
Japanese yards.  The second area is seen as Korean and other Asian yards because of 
the  labour  cost  advantage.  It was  clear  that  there  was  some  interchange  of 
information  between  Korean  and  Japanese  yards.  European yards  were  seen as 
competitors for passenger vessels, containerships for the North Atlantic market and 
reefer vessels. 
4. 2 8  A key short term problem is seen to be low prices.  MHI claimed to be making losses 
with the division being supported by  profits from  nuclear construction.  Kawasaki 
claimed  losses in  1991  because of the  exchange  rate losses on a  BP contract and 
Shikoku  reported  profits below requirements because of low prices.  The solutions 
were seen to  be increased volume, more added value products, increased productivity 
and  'avoiding unnecessary  competition'.  A quoted  example of the latter was the 
Royal Nedlloyd/IHI/Mitsubishi containership order. 
Marketing issues (Japan 109, EC average group 89) 
4.29  The total marketing effort applied is considerable and at different levels: 
•  links  with  the  trading  houses  through  the  banking  groups  and  specific 
agreements  give wide  coverage in  most  countries  on a commission basis. 
The trading houses are frequently  also the  'end customer'  as for example in 
a recent non-competitive  win from  an independent Hong  Kong based owner 
by  Mitsubishi Shipbuilding.  The vessels were to  be  chartered to  Mitsubishi 
Auto under a deal arranged by Mitsubishi Corporation; 
•  Heavy  Industry  division offices  which  support the  shipbuilding company. 
For example, MHI maintain offices in London, New York and Hong Kong; 
•  Tokyo office  based staff.  All shipyards have Tokyo offices basically serving 
the  domestic  owner.  Mitsubishi  have over 50  sales people  and Kawasaki 
over 30 in these offices; 
•  shipyard based sales teams who focus on non-Japanese customers. 
4. 30  Innovation and  product development  is seen as  an important competitive advantage, 
eg  the hatchless containership design  by  MHI  for Nedlloyd.  Groups tend to  have 
large centralised research facilities and spend between 2 and 4% of revenue on R&D. 
Member companies have restricted individual facilities  with typical spends of around 
0.5% of sales. 
Purchasing issues (Japan 118, average group 96) 
4. 31  Japanese  shipbuilders  are  more  effective  in  applying  purchasing  muscle  than the 
European industry.  Major items,  particularly steel and engine/propulsion units,  are 
channelled through  the lead companies  so  that there  are  in effect seven purchasing 
points.  In general smaller items are purchased at yard level.  Kawasaki are seeking to 
extend the  advantages  of mass  further by  co-ordinating purchasing throughout the 
KHI  Union. 
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4.32  Economies  of scale in the purchasing unit are matched by economies in the supplier 
base  with about five  or six main suppliers  in each of the  component  areas.  This 
situation  is  re-enforced  by  the  linkages  between  suppliers  and  builders  and  the 
opportunities  for  advantageous transfer pricing.  Most of the group  lead companies 
have their own engine production facilities  which are also marketed to  EC builders 
through  the  European  licensors.  The  supply  industry  is  well  established  and 
generally very efficient. 
4.33  In  consequence  virtually  all  non-owner  specified  materials  and  equipment  are 
sourced  in Japan, and  builders claim they can buy Japanese equipment cheaper than 
European  yards.  They further state  that they  cannot buy  European equipment as 
cheaply  as European companies and  are, in some cases, seeking to  set up purchasing 
relationships with European yards. 
4. 34  Generally  about  15  - 20%  of direct  work is  sub-contracted.  Suppliers  are viewed 
'almost as subsidiaries' with two or three in each area to provide competition. 
Human Resource issues (Japan 118, EC average group 1  08) 
4.35  Employment  in the  Japanese  industry  increased  significantly in  1991.  This  was 
mostly in the area of yard  sub-contractors  but there was also  growth in the number 
of direct employees.  In  all our shipyard  visits, reports  were received of the  start of 
apprentice  recruitment in the last 12 months.  Japanese yards  use a high  proportion 
of  sub-contractors  many  of  whom  are  based  in  and  permanently  attached  to 
individual yards.  This allows the yards  the  flexibility  of directly employing  only a 
core company workforce. 
Shipbuilding  Sector  Employment 
Direct 
Emploxees  Sub-contractors  Total 
1988  23609  11809  35418 
1989  22731  12883  35614 
1990  22859  13203  36062 
1991  24006  17882  41888 
Source:  Fifth Joint  Study Team  of the Labour Management  Conference  in 
the Shipbuilding Industry, May  1992 
4.36  Labour shortages, particularly in technical areas, and  an  ageing workforce  (average 
age  44 in direct employees, 46 in sub-contractors) were identified by  yards as major 
problems.  To  cope  with  this,  a  number  of initiatives  have  been  implemented 
including: 
•  apprenticeship recruitment; 
•  job rotation schemes; 
•  blue and white collar in-house training schemes; 
•  recruitment of women, particularly in supervising robots; 
planned reduction in working hours; 
•  investment in improved working conditions; 
•  individual training programmes and  multi-skilling; 
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•  environmental  improvements  with  government grants  for  greening  up the 
shipyards. 
4.38  Labour  premiums  are  thought  to  be  about  20/25%  because  of the  3K industry 
image.  The solutions to the twin problems of a high labour cost base and the ageing 
workforce  are focussed  on improved productivity  and working  conditions and  the 
expanded recruitment of apprentices. 
Design and technical issues (Japan 97, EC average group 97) 
4. 39  The  shipbuilding groups have  an  immense design capability  and experience.  The 
application of new technology to the design process varies widely from  yard to  yard 
from  the very basic to the highly sophisticated.  In many yards this is an increasingly 
important area for further investment as a means to  improve productivity and quality 
of work and to overcome shortages of skilled people. 
4.40  There is a massive R&D capacity within the major groups  which is being increasingly 
funded  now  that  the  long  shipbuilding  recessionary  period  is  felt  to  be  over. 
Priorities  include  product  development  (both  step  changes  and  continuous 
improvement),  automation  of production  processes  (eg  prefabrication,  assembly, 
block shotblasting and painting) and  development and application of new materials. 
Planning and organisation of work issues  (Japan 113, EC  average group 
84) 
4.41  The shipyards visited had simple  and  highly effective planning  and  control systems 
which were  still largely manual.  This  is  seen  as  an  area  for increased computer 
application to  reduce staff levels. 
4.42  Production  engineering  (detailed  planning  and  work preparation)  was superior to 
European  yards  in  terms  of  the  elimination  of  non-value  adding  work,  eg 
scaffolding,  and  the  execution  of work  at  the  optimum  stage  of production. 
Production  processes  are  organised so  that job times  can  be  accurately  predicted. 
Material control was, without exception, excellent. 
4.4  3  Cycle times are minimised by  the reliability of the delivery of supplies, the evident 
commitment throughout  the  organisations  to  meet planned  dates for completion of 
activities and the overlapping of steel and outfit activities. 
Production issues (Japan 107, EC average group 1  00) 
4.44  The  application of the latest production technology  and  automation is limited to  a 
few lead yards.  Major investment is planned over the next five years. 
4.45  Facilities  and  equipment  are  broadly  in  line with  European  norms  and  are well 
maintained.  Advanced  outfitting techniques  are  consistently  applied  in  all  yards 
whereas in Europe  the application is  patchy.  Similarly quality  and  accuracy control 
is given the highest priority. 
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Investment Trends 
4.46  During  the  1980s,  there  was  comparatively  little capital  investment in Japanese 
shipbuilding  facilities  and the emphasis was very much on cutting production costs. 
Under  a  Ministry of Transport initiative, the seven major builders have launched 
programmes  for  replacement,  modernisation  and  workshop  construction. 
Expenditure  of 2 - 3%  of revenues a year is planned in two phases- the first phase 
generally  being  1990  to  1995  with  the  expectation  that VLCC  replacement will 
accelerate from  1996. 
4.46  Specific initiatives include: 
•  NKK, Tsu: 
•  Kawasaki, Sakaide: 
•  Hiatchi, Ariake: 
installation of goliath crane for turning 400t bottom 
blocks  and  conveyorisation  of subassembly  lines in 
1992; 
automation  of pipeshop,  block  assembly  and  new 
painting  plant  by  1995  and  automation  of painting 
plant in phase 2. 
robotisation of section cutting by 1994 . 
3D  large  block  system  for  double  hull  tanks 
construction completed; 
new painting plant with robotisation to  be built. 
Similar initiatives are  underway  in  the  other  yards  with  a  focus  on  introducing 
computer  integrated manufacturing, new painting  and  welding facilities  for double 
hull tankers, and environmental improvements with a minimisation of outdoor work. 
4.48  On  research  and  development,  continuing  projects  receiving  Government support 
would appear to  be: 
•  the techno-superliner  with research co-ordinated by  Technological Research 
Association of Techno-Superliner  with a five  year budget of 9  billion yen 
with 33% subsidy; 
highly reliable marine propulsion plant being undertaken by  ADD Inc with a 
six year budget of 2.5  billion yen and a 40% subsidy; 
•  CIMS project; 
•  super-conducting electromagnet propulsion ship project involving Mitsubishi 
and others. 
Summary of competitive advantages 
4.49  In  summary there  would  appear to  be  six  major  features of the  Japanese industry 
which create competitive advantages. 
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4.50  Firstly, the preferred access  to the large Japanese domestic shipowner market with its 
tolerance  for premium  pricing.  This arises from  cultural factors,  interlinked interest 
group pressures, home credit schemes  and  the quality of the Japanese shipbuilding 
product. 
4.51  Secondly,  the Japanese shipbuilding group  structure with its competition, marketing, 
purchasing and technology transfer benefits. 
4.52  Thirdly, the  major and government supported  R&D effort to  improve products  and 
the efficiency of yards, and to develop new products. 
4.53  Fourthly,  the  pro-active  marketing  resources  and  programmes  targeted  at clearly 
defined owner markets. 
4.54  Fifthly, high productivity coupled with hourly labour costs no  higher than major EC 
builders and supported by an efficient and  competitive supply industry. 
4.55  And  sixthly,  high quality  and  reliability of vessels plus prompt/timely  delivery on 
relatively short cycles. 
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5  The Korean shipbuilding industry 
Basic structural features 
5 .1  The Korean industry  has shown significant growth during  the  1980s  with a share of 
world production growing  from  3.7% in 1981  to  15.1% in 1991.  The share of new 
orders over the period increased from  6.5% to  18.6%, which exceeded the total share 
secured by European Community yards. 
5.2  The industry  is heavily concentrated  with four of the  15  companies accounting for 
89%  of production.  Hyundai and Daewoo are  the two largest individual yards in the 
world both in terms of production and forward order book. 
1991  production 
'000  CGT  %  of industry 
Hyundai  797  46.1 
Daewoo  405  23.4 
Samsung  189  10.9 
Hanjin  150  8.7 
11 others  189  10.9 
Total  1730  100 
Source:  EEC database 
5. 3  The  four major companies  are  members of large  diversified industrial and trading 
groups.  There  would  appear  to  be  little  co-operation  between  the  individual 
shipbuilding yards. 
5.4  There is a limited degree of yard specialisation. 
Hanjin 
Sam sung 
Daewoo 
Hyundai 
Home market influences 
containerships 
Panamax  bulkers,  tankers  and  containerships,  but  have 
recently applied to build VLCCs 
large bulkers and VLCCs 
very broad range 
5.5  In  total terms,  the  Korean shipowner market is  relatively small accounting for less 
than 4% of world production in the period  1989  - 91.  Representation is significantly 
higher  than this  level in  the  two  areas  of containerships  and  bulkers.  Hyundai 
Merchant  Marine and  Hanjin  Shipping are two major domestic shipowners closely 
related  to  the  shipbuilding  companies.  Neither Samsung  nor Daewoo  have this 
support. 
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5. 6  The  industry  is heavily influenced  by government directive as demonstrated by  the 
maximum  5%  limit on the  1992 pay round.  According to the  US  lTC June  1992 
report there are no  specific financing  or subsidy schemes outside OECD agreements 
to  encourage shipbuilding  apart from  performance and  financial guarantees offered 
by  Eximbank.  However, we  understand  that losses  of the  bank  and  the  export 
insurance  fund  are covered by the Government, and discussed illustrations from EC 
shipowners of financing schemes considerably more advantageous than OECD. 
5. 7  For domestic owners, the national  shipbuilding  programmes are  financed  by credits 
from  the Korean Development Bank.  We understand that these  are more favourable 
than OECD terms. 
5.8  The overall  Korean market share of 15%  is  heavily  concentrated  on  tankers  and 
bulkers. 
%  market share 
Gas carriers  10 
Tankers  20.1 
Bulkers  22.4 
Dry cargo  10.3 
Others  5.9 
Total  15.1 
Source:  Lloyds database/CESA 
Operational features 
5. 9  In terms of both output performance  and  ratings on use of best practice, the Korean 
industry  is  broadly in  line with the group  of EC  average  yards.  This comparative 
performance  is  supported  by  figures  from  a major engine  supplier  which  show a 
10%  lower man  hour figure  for  the  Korean licensee  compared  to  the  European 
manufacturer. 
Output  Use  of  best 
performance  practice 
100  Korea  101 
105  EC averajte group  96 
Source:  Shipyard visit programme 
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5. 10  At the functional  level, the major differences on best practice are in marketing  and 
purchasing. 
Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
Management ~arketlngF  ~rchaslng  Resources lrechnlcal  Planning l»roductlon 
EC  average  98  89  %  108  97  84  100 
group 
Korean  98  128  84  115  92  84  109 
I yards 
Source:  Yard visit programme 
Strategy/Management issues  (Korea 98, EC average group 98) 
5 .11  The  two  yards  visited had  very  different  product  market  strategies.  Daewoo is 
focussing  almost entirely on VLCCs.  In contrast Hyundai are  following a policy of 
product flexibility on series build of large vessels excluding passenger ships.  This is 
combined with a clear concept of moving to higher value products because of threats 
from lower cost producers. 
5.12  The  major competition  is  seen as  being Japanese yards  who  are  perceived to have 
superior  technical capability,  R&D  and  productivity;  and  other  Asian yards  who 
provide  increasing  low  cost  competition.  The  actions  required  to  compete 
successfully have been  identified  as  productivity  improvement  and  both ship  and 
shipbuilding technology  upgrading. 
Marketing issues (Korea 128, EC average group 89) 
5.13  According  to  the  shipowners  we  interviewed,  Hyundai  are  the  most  pro-active 
marketing  organisation in shipbuilding with  a well thought out and executed contact 
programme  featuring  at  minimum  weekly  contact  with  owners.  According  to 
Hyundai  this  is  achieved by having  over 100 staff full  time on sales and  marketing · 
activities:  13  overseas in Hyundai Heavy  Industries sales offices; 30 marketing staff 
in Ulsan;  30 projects managers in  Ulsan;and 30 after sales staff  worldwide.  Daewoo 
claimed a figure  of 200 staff in similar roles.  An interesting philosophical difference 
is that in Hyundai  aftersales is part of the marketing department whereas in Japan it is 
part of quality assurance. 
5.14  We understand that R&D in Korea is mostly shipyard based  with a claimed 5% only 
from  direct  government  funding.  Both  Daewoo  and  Hyundai  have  technical 
research institutes on site with over 200 staff each but the research programmes seem 
to  be more development orientated rather than targeted at real innovation. 
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Purchasing (Korea 84, EC average group 96) 
5.15  It was indicated  to  us  that about 40%  of all equipment and  materials is imported 
either because of owner specifications, particularly  in  reference to  electronics, or 
restrictions  of supply  from  the domestic  steel industry.  For example, Spain  is  an 
important  source of steel.  A key objective is  to increase the degree of 'localisation' 
(home  sourced  content)  both  to  reduce  total  costs and  the  trade  imbalance  with 
Japan, the major supply nation.  Estimates were given that Korean sourced materials 
were 3 to 5% cheaper than Japanese equivalents. 
Human Resources (Korea 115, EC average group 108) 
5.16  The age profile of the labour force is  much younger  (at 37) than both in Japan and 
EC yards.  With an hourly cost of around ECU 8.33 labour costs are about half those 
of comparable European  yards  although  shipbuilding workers  were said to  be the 
highest paid industrial group in Korea.  Although recruitment is not yet a problem, it 
was stated that shipbuilding no longer attracts the brightest university  graduates and 
this is  acknowledged  as a potential future  issue.  Labour  relations were now said to 
have  normalised  after the problems  of the  late  1980s  and  there  was  evidence  of 
significant  training  programmes  and  quality  circle  concept  involvement 
programmes.  For example,  Daewoo has around 600  quality  circles each with about 
20 employees and  a strongly competitive environment for idea generation. 
Design and Technical (Korea 92, EC average group 97) 
5.17  The  yards  visited  had  major  design  capacity  although  experience  tended  to  be 
narrower than the long established EC and Japanese yards.  The yards were relatively 
weak in  production engineering/design  for production.  Investment in  CAD systems 
and equipment has been extensive but implementation has been rather slow.  R&D in 
design and manufacturing mounted through the on-site 'institutes' seems very much 
to  be in support of day to day  activities and is  impressive but may lack effectiveness 
in  significantly  assisting  long-term  competitiveness.  Having  said  that,  Hyundai 
claimed to have had 60 engineers working full time on LNG development for the last 
four  years.  The Korean yards have the scale to bring significant resources to bear on 
development projects. 
Planning and organisation of work (Korea 84, EC average group  84) 
5. 18  Planning  and  control  systems are  generally unsophisticated  and less  effective than 
those  in Japan and the EC above average group  of yards.  High volume of output 
gives the opportunity to improve effectiveness in this area. 
Production (Korea 109, EC average group 100) 
5.19  Both  Daewoo  and  Hyundai  are  essentially  1970s  yards  in terms of facilities  and 
equipment.  Some  advantage  is  gained  in  resource  management  by  having  the 
flexibility  of single  site activities  with a comparatively large  throughput.  There is 
little or no sub-contracting of shipbuilding activity. 
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5.20  Advanced  outfitting techniques  are  consistently  applied  and  short build  cycles are 
being  achieved.  There  is  relatively  little development  in  terms  of automation, 
robotics or accuracy control. 
Investment trends 
5. 21  Initial investment in advanced technology has been made in some areas, for example 
CAD/CAM though implementation has yet to be completed.  Computer applications 
in other  areas, for example  planning  are  also  in the early  stages.  The investment 
programmes  discussed  centered  on  evolutionary  change,  eg  increasing  covered 
workspace, semi-automatic welding, implementing CAD/CAM, rather than  any  more 
fundamental  step  changes  through  significant  automation  or  introduction  of 
robotics. 
Summary of competitive advantage 
5.22  The most significant advantage is cost competitiveness driven by a relatively low cost 
of labour compared  to most EC yards and  an output performance level in line with 
the  EC average.  Material costs  are  probably  lower than  for  European  yards  both 
because  of the  relative  purchasing  muscle  of the  yards  and  the  availability of 
favourable  transfer  prices  from  state owned  Pohang  Steel.  Incremental  volume 
advantages  are  obtained  because  of the  very  strict  government  controls  on  the 
national shipowners.  The move to localisation, with a higher Korean material content 
and  the planned  productivity improvements of 15/20%  in 1992/93 will keep Korean 
prices keen in the short term. 
5.23  This is supported by  heavyweight and  high quality  marketing  programmes which 
ensure that Korean yards are on most owners' quotation lists when new shipbuilding 
projects are being developed. 
5.24  Very  competitive  financing  schemes  are  available  for  foreign  owners  from  the 
Korean Eximbank. 
5.25  Korean  yards  can  deliver  to  very  short  cycles  with  a  high  degree  of delivery , 
reliability.  They have the  scale to deliver large series orders from  one  site which is a 
significant  benefit  to  some  owners  both  on  timing  and  in  the  reduction  of 
supervision costs. 
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6  The Finnish Shipbuilding Industry 
Basic structural features 
6.1  The Finnish shipbuilding  industry  is highly  concentrated  with two companies (four 
shipyards) Kvaerner-Masa and Finnyards, accounting for over 95% of production. 
6.2  Kvaerner-Masa grew out of the ashes  of Wartsila Marine Industries  in 1991  and has 
two major yards, Masa Helsinki and Masa Turku.  Finnyards was formed through the 
marriage  of Rauma Yards, part of Finland's largest industrial group Repola,  and the 
privately  owned Hollming  shipyard.  The  Finnish state has  a minority  holding in 
Finn  yards. 
6. 3  The companies  compete with each other.  Both companies  specialise in cruise ships, 
ferries and ro-ros, and ice breakers. 
Home market influences 
6.4  The  Finnish  shipowner market  is  small.  However, since  it  is  predominantly  in 
passenger ship/ferry, cruise and liner trades, which has generated the specialisation of 
Finnish shipyards, a high proportion of Finnish ships are built in Finland. 
Operational features 
6. 5  In terms of both output performance  and ratings on use of best practice, the Finnish 
industry  is between the group  of average EC  yards  and  the group  of above average 
EC yards. 
Output  Use  of  best 
performance  practice 
124  Finland  106 
105  EC average group  96 
Source:  Shipyard visit programme 
6.6  At  the  functional  level, the  major  differences  on best  practice  compared  to  the 
average  EC  group  of  yards  are  in  marketing,  design/technical,  planning  and 
production where the Finnish yards  are significantly better. 
Strategy/  Human  Design/ 
Manaeement Marketine Purchasine Resource~ Technical Plannine Production 
EC  average  98  89  96  108  97  84  100 
group 
Finnish  95  114  91  94  120  111  108 
yards 
Source:  Shipyard visit programme 
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Strategy/management issues (Finland 95, EC average group 98) 
6. 7  Both yards  visited had similar product market  strategies which focussed  on  "highly 
designed", state of the art, one-off ships. 
6.8  The  main  competition  is  seen  as  being  almost exclusively from  Europe  and  they 
expect this situation to remain so for the time being. 
6. 9  If there was  a weakness apparent in the  two companies whose yards were visited, it 
was that there is still some way to go  in rationalising and  consolidating the resources 
of the two pairs of yards. 
Marketing issues (Finland 114, EC average group 89) 
6. 10  Both yards visited clearly know their markets, have good people and  are successful -
combining "speculative" design  work  with  a  well  thought out analysis  of owner 
needs and market trends. 
Purchasing (Finland 91, EC average group 96) 
6.11  Basically  sound  but  disappointing  from  the  point  that  the  benefits  of group 
membership  are  not  being fully  utilised.  Purchasing efficiency is  handicapped  to 
some extent by the strategy of producing one-offs  and is not helped by the typically 
short lead times the yards have to cope with due to late owner decisions. 
6.12  Over 60% of materials and  equipment including engines and  most steel is purchased 
in Finland.  However, the Finnish marine supply industry is still contracting. 
Human Resources (Finland 94, EC average group 108) 
6.13  Good worker participation and seemingly harmonious labour relations helped in one 
case  by  recent  bad  times  and  previous  company  bankruptcy.  Generally  good 
progress in multi-skilling. 
Design/technical (Finland 120, EC average group 97) 
6.14  Impressive  design  capability  and  experience,  and  well  organised  and  planned 
technical offices in both yards  visited.  In one case, very close integration of design 
and  production  is  achieved  by  assigning  a  multi-discipline  team  the  total 
responsibility for a ship zone. 
6.15  Extensive  use of CAD  systems  and  integration of planning to  allow  early outfit in 
spite of short lead times.  Both yards produced very detailed production information. 
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Planning (Finland 111, EC average group 84) 
6.16  Both  yards  had  multi-level,  decentralised  planning  with  high  pnonty  given  to 
resource  management  to  achieve short  build  cycles.  Computer  based material 
control systems effectively used to  ensure  material for work packages are delivered 
to the right place at the right time. 
Production (Finland 108, EC average group 1  00) 
6.17  The Finnish yards  were comparable to  the EC  group  on  steelwork production but 
were better on  accuracy  control, and early painting and outfitting,  to  reduce build 
cycle time - a performance measure upon which they focussed. 
Competitive advantage 
6.18  Although Finnish labour costs  and  productivity  are similar to their main (European) 
competitors, their product market  focus  coupled  with the  related high  standards of 
design  creates a competitive  advantage  for  them  in  the  cruise  and  ferry  and  ice 
breaker markets. 
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7  Factors in competiveness 
7.1  There are  clearly many, many factors  that determine overall competitiveness which 
we have defined  as  the  ability to  win and  execute  shipbuilding  orders  and  stay in 
business.  Some  of these  factors  are  based  on  objective  criteria  but  many  are 
subjective and relate to  confidence in the  yard and the management team.  However, 
it is  possible to  generalise  that there  is  a base  buying  model  which  is  used  by 
shipowners  in both Europe  and  the Far East, and  is also independent  of whether or 
not they have a direct interest in a shipbuilding yard.  The basic buying model is: 
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Initial business case covering: 
•  feasibility study 
•  concept design 
Selection of yards to tender 
Shortlisting on basis of: 
•  delivery timescale 
•  acceptable specification 
•  pricing indication 
t 
Negotiations with shortlisted 
companies 
Final shortlisting on basis of: 
•  product performance 
•  cost to the owner 
•  delivery cycle 
Financial engineering/ 
commercial evaluation 
Decision 
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7.2  For a shipbuilder to compete successfully he clearly has to  satisfy the criteria at each 
stage  of the  buying  process.  From  this  perspective  this  overall task can be sub-
divided into five stages: 
Market access 
Marketing 
Cost to the owner 
Product innovation 
Delivery 
will I be considered for the shortlist? 
will I be on the shortlist? 
can I be competitive on cost? 
can I offer an added value ship? 
can I meet or beat the required delivery time? 
7. 3  Within each of these areas there is a complex of factors which together make-up the 
factors  of  competitiveness.  The  following  sections  look  at  what  our research 
programme  has indicated to be the key areas, and look at broad  relative competitive 
strength of the EC shipbuilding industry against each. 
~arketaccessissues 
7.4  EC  shipbuilders  do  not have  access  to  either  the  Japanese  or Korean  shipowner 
markets.  Of the 7,534,000 CGT delivered to Japanese owners in the period 1989/91, 
only  5,000 CGT was EC built.  Of the  1,284,000 CGT delivered to Korean owners, 
none  was  EC supplied  according  to  Lloyds  databases.  There  are  a  number  of 
reasons for this including: 
•  strict  controls  on  purchasing  new  and  secondhand  ships  by  the  ROK 
government; 
•  financial  links  and  consequent  shareholder  pressure  between  shipowners, 
builders and finance companies in both Japan and Korea; 
the  influence  of home  credit  schemes  which  may  have  recently  been 
liberalised  but  mean  that only  one  foreign  built  ship  has  been  completed 
under the Japan Development Bank finance programme as  at July  1992. 
7.5  In contrast 34% of the EC shipowner market is held by Korea and Japan.  Indeed in 
the  tanker  and  bulker  product markets,  Korean  builders have  the  largest market 
share, with Japan second and the EC in third place in what is  a 'home'  market.  The , 
net  effect is  that  the  market open to  both the  Korean  and  Japanese  industries  is 
significantly larger than that available to EC builders. 
7. 6  As  an additional constraint, entry  into new markets is  becoming more difficult for 
builders.  Given the current economic difficulties in the shipping industry, and  the 
increasing competitive and cost conscious environment they  anticipate in the future, 
many  EC  shipowners in  particular have  stated  that they  are  becoming  more  risk 
averse.  An avoidable  risk is  being  the  first owner of a particular vessel type in a 
yard.  Increasingly owners  are  apparently  looking  to place their orders with yards 
with  specific product experience,  eg  double  hulled  VLCCs.  Within the Japanese 
industry  structure this does not appear to  be a major problem and  the  re-emergence 
of the  LNG  market has  quickly  seen initial orders  for  ships  being  spread  across 
many  of the  major groups.  A similar position occurs in Korea  with the government 
promotion  of LNG  orders  to  Hyundai.  It is clearly less of an  issue when a yard  is 
part  of a shipowning  group,  but  for  the  majority  of EC  yards  this  difficulty  of 
achieving early market entry could be a significant future constraint. 
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Marketing issues 
7. 7  In this context marketing has  been defined  as the process of getting on the selective 
list of yards  to  be  considered,  assuming  the  market  is  open,  with the  maximum 
chance to  be finally  successful.  The EC shipowners interviewed as part of this study 
had a very clear ranking of the effectiveness of builders in this area being: 
1  Hyundai 
2  The Japanese 
3  Polish, Chinese, other Eastern Europe 
4  EC yards 
There are recognised exceptions to  the general ranking with a minority of EC yards 
being considered to  be  very effective.  However,  the  vast majority of yards  were 
thought  to  be at a competitive disadvantage  because of failings  in their marketing. 
This  is  strongly  supported  by  the  comparison of best practice  ratings  identified 
during our yard research. 
7. 8  The majority of owners stated they  had  never been approached  pro-actively by EC 
yards.  The only contact with the  yards  was in response to  invitations to  tender.  In 
contrast  Hyundai  make contact  at least  monthly  and  in  many cases  weekly, the 
Japanese at least quarterly and the others at least six monthly.  However, EC repair 
yards are seen to be very pro-active and aggressive. 
7. 9  Where  EC  yards  do  initiate  contact,  it  tends  to  be  chairman  to  chairman/chief 
executive visits which are courtesy visits and are generally held to  be  unsophisticated 
and  unproductive.  The  advantages of regular contact are  seen by  shipowners  as 
being: 
•  helpful in building market know ledge; 
•  help shape the design concepts the owner is working on; 
•  help the decision of when to place the order. 
The  situation  was  summed  up  by  a senior director at  one  of the  largest shipping , 
companies  - "a  yard  who has not called regularly  is at a basic design disadvantage 
from  day one - and of course soon we '11  stop inviting them to tender". 
7.10  Aftersales  service is seen as  a key  area  by  shipowners  and  much less  so  by  EC 
shipbuilders.  At the risk of over generalising, the perception of the shipowners is: 
•  that  the  Koreans  are  pro-active  and  seek opportunities  to  visit  ships  and 
discuss performance with owners; 
•  the Japanese are superb in quickly resolving problems if they emerge; 
•  the  Europeans  are  basically hostile  and  will seek to  blame  poor operating 
procedures or material/equipment suppliers. 
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This  difference  would  appear to  be  one  of basic business  philosophy  and  it is 
probably significant that the company organisation structures for the three industries 
show that the aftersales department: 
in Hyundai is part of the marketing department; 
•  in Japan is part of the quality assurance department (as it is in Daewoo); 
in Europe generally reports into production. 
Cost to the owner issues 
7.11  A TecnEcon  study  of November  1991  showed  a price  disadvantage  for  most EC 
builders for  the  ship types  examined.  During  our shipowner research,  figures were 
being quoted  to  us of a Korean advantage of 10-25%  and Japanese prices being 5-
15%  lower than  EC  equivalents,  with  isolated  examples  of  significantly  larger 
differentials.  However, it must  be  stressed  that  these figures  cannot  be  directly 
compared  with TecnEcon results:  there  were  no  controls  to  ensure  like-for-like 
specifications, nor guarantees that the EC price was the most competitive available. 
7.12  A significant and yard controllable cost is  the  cost of labour expressed  as  cost per 
CGT  of output.  The  chart  below  shows  the  comparative  position  of the  yards 
surveyed. 
MAN HOURS 
PERCGT-
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From this  it is  clear that the Koreans have labour cost leadership based on average 
output  efficiency  and  relatively  low  hourly  costs.  The  Japanese  yards  are 
competitive based on high efficiency and high labour costs.  A minority of EC yards 
approach these levels but the majority have a significant cost disadvantage because of 
poor output performance. 
7. 13  A major factor in total cost in shipbuilding in the cost of materials.  As this was not a 
specific comparative cost study, detailed information on relative material costs is not 
available.  However, a feature of both the Japanese and  Korean industries is a greater 
degree  of  concentration into much larger scale units both in shipbuilding and in the 
main supply industry.  The possible cost advantages of this  are shown in a study by 
AESA  and  Fincantieri indicating a  potential material cost saving  of 10%  by  co-
ordinating  purchasing  and  rationalising  the  number  of suppliers.  Further savings 
were thought possible if the supply industry itself could be rationalised so  that the 
scale of suppliers was equivalent to that in Japan. 
7.14  For about half of the  owners interviewed, the  issue of finance plays  no  role in the 
selection of yards because they arrange their own independent financing  with cash 
deals with the yards.  The reasons for this include: 
•  ability to obtain rates lower than OECD rules; 
•  ability to have longer tenns than the OECD maximum; 
•  ability to  address the issue of residual values. 
Where  owners  arrange  financing  through  the  yards  the  general experience  would 
appear to  be that Japanese and  EC  schemes  are  generally  comparable  but that very 
favourable  schemes can be obtained from  Korea including low  interest rates, interest 
free periods, extended timescales and less onerous guarantees. 
7. 15  Because the international market is  largely dollar denominated, the cost to the owner 
of any  individual shipyard  is heavily influenced by exchange  rate movements.  The 
analysis  in Appendix 4 shows  the long term  correlation between market share and 
relative  exchange  rates  for  the  major  countries.  Whilst  this  does  show  some 
relationships,  levels of correlation are  generally low, showing that other factors  are  , 
also important.  Over the short tenn, ship owners we interviewed said the  continuing 
depreciation of the  won  in  1991  and  early  1992  have  increased  Korea's  relative 
competitiveness - and  this is clearly reflected in the  increase in share of new orders 
placed. 
Product innovation issues 
7.16  In  broad terms owners feel that the  European Community shipbuilding industry is 
not offering any  significant product innovation, such  as would favourably  influence 
their  decision.  Specific  examples  mentioned  by  respondents  included hatchless 
containership designs, propeller innovations and hull design. 
FINAL- 2 October 1992 
Commission of the European Communities:  Report  58 kP/l4hJ Peat Marwick 
Delivery issues 
7.17  Shorter  cycle  times  are  increasingly  important  to  shipowners  according  to 
respondents,  primarily  because  it  greatly  facilitates  their  commercial  strategy 
decision making but also because there is a direct cost benefit in reduced finance  and 
supeiVision costs.  An example from  a major UK owner on their previous orders was 
a cost of $450,000 in Japan for  supeiVision compared  with $750,000 in Germany 
because of a longer cycle time. 
7.18  Actual  performance  of EC  yards on cycle times  varies  by  product  type.  Using a 
'better than average EC yard' the typical comparison is: 
Cruiseships 
Containerships 
Reefers 
Tanker/Bulker 
Source: 
NB: 
Keel-Launch  Keel-Delivery 
ECyard  39  60 
Finnish yard  26  50 
ECyard  23  45 
Japanese yard  14  28 
ECyard  12  27 
Japanese yard  15  30 
ECyard  18  38 
Japanese yard  13  30 
Yard visit programme 
Values in weeks.  Korean cycle times are approaching the  Japanese 
level 
7.19  As  important  as  cycle times  is  delivery  reliability.  The Japanese are  reported  as 
being  100%  reliable, the Koreans as being increasingly able to deliver early.  Penalty 
clauses  in  contracts  are  becoming  increasingly  onerous  and  whilst the  very best 
European yards  can live with this, many expressed concern - not so much because of 
internal constraints but more because of unreliability in the supplier infrastructure. 
Agenda for the EC industry 
7.20  This is clearly set by the earlier paragraphs.  To compete  successfully in the existing 
market  the  EC industry must adopt best practices.  However, to see if these will be 
enough  to  maintain  market  share  in  the  1990s,  it is  necessary  to  briefly review 
expected key developments. 
Key developments in the world shipbuilding market 
7.21  AWES has recently published a forecast for the annual average requirements for new 
ships up to the year 2005.  This  forecast shows a predicted annual average for world 
shipyard activity in compensated gross tonnes as: 
1991  - 1995 
1995  - 2000 
2000 - 2005 
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11.8 million cgt 
15.4 million cgt 
18.7 million cgt 
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The implication  of this forecast is that there will be little change  in demand up to 
1995,  a period then of volume growth of about 10%  a year for  five  years, followed 
by  a period of low or zero growth but with a base level of demand  58%  higher than 
today. 
7.22  AWES  have  compared  their  figures  with  the  April  1991  forecast  by  the  Japan 
Maritime  Research Institute.  The  JAMRI  results,  using  a  different  methodology 
based  on  forecasts  of shipping demand,  suggest the  same level  of total  demand 
across the period but with the start of growth earlier in the  1990s and  with a lower 
growth rate in the late 1990s. 
7.23  The  forecasts  by product market show  expected  growth in demand in all  sectors 
except containerships.  In  contribution terms,  of particular note  are  the expected 
increases  of 50%  for  dry cargo vessels  and  30%  for gas/chemical  carriers, and the 
40%  decline in contribution for containerships. 
%  of demand in  CGT 1991  - 1995  1995  - 2000  2000  - 2005 
Oil tankers  20.3  17  20.5 
Bulk carriers  23.8  21.6  21.2 
Other dry cargo  11.8  21.2  17.9 
Reefers  2.4  2.5  2.7 
Containerships  10.1  6.2  5.7 
Gas/chemical carriers  6.2  7.6  8 
Fishing vessels  11.1  9.8  11 
Other non-cargo  14.3  14  13 
Source:  AWES Annual Report 1991/1992 
7.24  In  its studies AWES  does  not see lack of capacity  as  a  short  term  constraint on 
growth in  demand.  Their studies predict an  available capacity  for  1995  of 17.7 
million CGT of which 18.6%  is  indicated to  be in the European Community.  The 
figures  show that the EC industry is  currently operating at  about 93%  of capacity. 
The assumed market share figures  show no  overall increases compared  to the average 
share of output of 1987/91, with loss of share in fishing vessels and  other non-cargo , 
ships, offset by small increases in bulk carriers and tankers. 
7.25  In  terms of research and  technological developments that are seen by the industry to 
be  important to  competitiveness in both the short and long-term,  the Bossard Report 
to the Commission in November 1991  indicated the priorities to  be: 
•  ship product  development,  ie  fast ships,  automation  and  reduced  manning 
and better environmental protection; 
•  composite materials, standards and better corrosion properties; 
•  improved standardisation and  reliability of equipment; 
•  CIM  and  automated production; 
management, production engineering, cost control and  marketing issues. 
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7.26  Overall the Japanese market share is strongly  related to movements in the exchange 
rate,  as  detailed in  Appendix  7.  The  appreciation of the  yen against the  dollar 
during  the  1980s  put  the  pressure  on  cost reduction,  and  was  mostly  offset  by 
productivity improvements in Japanese shipbuilding.  Current forecasts  for the yen 
are  mixed  with Goldman  Sachs  suggesting depreciation  and  OECD  and  London 
Business School suggesting appreciation by  up to  8% by  1999.  Even assuming this 
latter figure,  given the planned performance  increases, Japanese shipbuilding is likely 
to be significantly more competitive by the end of the decade. 
The forward view for European Community shipbuilders 
7.27  The environment for competition in summary therefore includes  a number of major 
components including: 
•  a rapidly  growing  world demand  with increases on current levels of 30% in 
1995/2000 and  60%  in 2000/2005; 
•  a forecast real decrease in demand  for containerships, a major contributor to 
the European industry; 
•  labour  output levels in Japan  which are now twice the  European norm  and 
are targeted to  be four times existing EC norms  by the 2000:  investment is 
being made now to achieve this; 
•  labour  costs  per  unit  output  in  Korea  at  50%  of European  norms  with 
significant short term improvement possible; 
increasing price competition from Eastern Europe and NIC shipyards; 
•  an uncertain exchange rate environment; 
•  increasing relative labour costs in Europe  through  convergence, particularly 
in Germany and  Portugal; 
a massive scale of and increasing investment in R&D in Japan; 
•  an  emerging  trend  in European shipowners  to  order more  standard  ships in 
order to  contain their cost inflation. 
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Summary of EC competitive position 
7.28  The  position of EC  shipbuilding is  shown in the  overview strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities  and  threats  (SWOT)  analysis below.  It should  be  noted  that this  is 
based  on  the  industry  as  a  whole  - the  situation  of  individual  yards  will be 
detennined by specific factors. 
Streneths  Weaknesses 
Strong European shipowner base  No access to Korean/Japanese 
Expertise in some product types - markets 
particularly passenger and  Very high cost base 
containerships 
Investment in CAD/CAM 
Opportunities  Threats 
Increase in total market  Fall in containership market 
Cost base reduction in Korea/ 
Japan 
Trend towards standard ships 
Exchange rate environment 
Japanese led R&D 
Priorities for the EC industry 
7.29  Given the situation in the SWOT analysis, if the industry is to  ensure that it at least 
maintains  its  current  share  of the  world  market,  it  must  greatly  improve  its 
competitive position.  The key priorities in this are to: 
•  maintain  access  to  existing  markets  and  where  possible  to  ensure  more 
markets are open to competition; 
reduce its cost base; 
•  meet increased demand through productivity improvement; 
•  ensure it can build the right products. 
7.30  The  actions  necessary  to  achieve  this  are  essentially  within  the  control  of each 
shipyard.  That success is  possible is  demonstrated by  those EC yards  which have 
achieved a position of world class competitiveness by identifying a sector to compete 
in and organising themselves and  the resources  available in the most effective way. 
However, while the  prime  responsibility for  improving  industry  competitiveness is 
with the shipyards, there are  areas in ensuring resources  are available to  the industry 
where action by external agencies is indicated. 
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8  Indicated areas for industry action 
8. 1  To develop a set of appropriate options for improving competitiveness we have used 
the following  model which differentiates between factors internal to, and controllable 
by, the individual shipyard, and those where external authority input is required. 
Fair 
competition 
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Access  to 
markets 
Creating  the  environment  for 
upgrading  and  innovation 
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Maximising the use of resources 
8. 2  At its most simple  this means  each yard  ensuring  that it is using  best practice as 
appropriate  to  its  size,  type  and  individual  business  objectives.  Our research 
programme  and  analysis has demonstrated  the link between the use of best practice 
and output performance measures which is shown in the graph below. 
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8. 3  It  is  clear from  this  that  the  key  requirement  is  for  an  industry which uses  best 
practice.  The  objective  for  the  industry,  and  the  determinant  of long  term 
competitiveness, is that each shipyard should have: 
•  a clear business strategy focusing on core product markets and stating how it 
will compete and how it will organise itself to compete; 
•  a  clear,  fully  resourced  marketing  programme,  appropriate  product 
development activity and a considered after sales policy; 
•  a  purchasing  policy  featuring  a  minimum  number  of suppliers, effective 
supply chain management and  strategic use of sub-contracting; 
human  resources  management  emphasing  skills  upgrading,  distributed 
decision making and effective recruitment; 
•  design  and  technical  systems  with  appropriate  use  of technology  and 
integration into downstream systems; 
•  planning  and  production  engineering  to  improve  build  strategies  and 
minimise build cycle times; 
•  appropriate production facilities, technologies and  automation. 
8 .4  A few  EC shipyards  have these  and  are  among  the world  leaders in their product 
markets.  However, with the exception of passenger cruise ships, among the shipyards 
visited there is only one yard  in this category in each of the following product areas: 
large tankers, bulk carriers, containerships, Ro-Ros, dredgers,  tugs and  reefers.  The 
level of real competition within the EC is low. 
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8.5  Setting an objective of implementing best practice is  deceptively simple.  In reality 
there will be a variety of constraints which confront yards including: 
•  the time required to change overall productivity significantly; 
•  the scale that is realistically achievable; 
•  the ability of yard management to do  it unaided; 
•  the natural resistance to change. 
8.6  Information  for  long  term  trend  analysis  of  productivity  improvement  in 
shipbuilding is  not readily  available.  However the  chart below,  taken  from  both 
Japanese  and  European  experience shows  improvements in productivity over a 20 
year period.  Whilst these cannot be  assumed  to be  typical, they  are illustrative of 
long term productivity trends.  The Japanese information relates to  steelwork man 
hours,  the  European  to  total  direct  hours.  Both  yards  currently  have  similar 
performance  levels, but are totally dissimilar in nature and  markets served.  The key 
point is that over the  20 year  period the  average productivity improvement  in the 
Japanese  yard  was 4.5%  a year  and  in  the  European  3.5%,  with, in both  cases, a 
maximum  achievement over a 5 year period of about 6%  a year.  At a more detailed 
level, the Japanese figures  show improvements in welding productivity of 9%  a year 
over a 12  year period. 
Long Term Productivity Trends 
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8. 7  The stated objective of the Japanese industry is  to reduce total man hours for each 
ship by 50% by the  end of the century.  This implies a productivity improvement of 
around  7%  a  year.  Although  this  is  higher than  the  20  year trend,  it could be 
achievable based on declared  investment plans and our own observations during the 
research  programme.  In  our  discussions  with EC  shipyard  management  teams, 
planned  productivity improvements grouped  in the range 3 to  6%.  At this level the 
overall competitive position of the  industry on labour costs  will  scarcely change. 
Among the  average and  below average EC  groups there appeared to be a very low 
recognition and  acceptance of the real differences of performance within the EC and 
Japanese industries - and  a low knowledge of the technologies  and  techniques used 
to achieve these performance figures. 
8. 8  The evidence from  our analysis of the relationship between output  and  productivity 
as shown in Appendix  5 implies that the non-EC  yards studied are  on a lower long 
term cost curve than the EC international group of shipyards as a whole.  To improve 
EC competitiveness significantly indicates the need for a 'step change' in  the use of 
technology,  rather  than the  incremental  developments  the .  industry  in  general is 
proposing.  The  mechanisms  for  achieving  a  step  change  include  technology 
transfer, increased co-operation and a re-focus to  either one-off or series build. 
8. 9  The fragmented nature of the EC industry has inhibited the transfer of technology as 
also has the competitive and independent nature of the companies within it.  In many 
cases it has  proved  easier to  transfer technology  from  Japan  than  from  within the 
Community. 
8. 10  Co-operation  or joint working can  clearly have benefits in  terms of cost reduction 
through economies  of scale and by facilitating technology transfer between partners. 
There is growing emergence of co-operation  within the EC, most clearly in the area 
of  purchasing.  Other  examples  of  strategic  co-operation,  as  opposed  to  sub-
contracting or project sharing, are more difficult to  find. 
8.11  Partly  through co-operation and  the  more  integrated  structure of the  Japanese and 
Korean  maritime  industries,  yards  in  those countries  have  a higher  ratio  of series 
building  than is  typical within the  EC.  Series building clearly  has  significant cost , 
curve benefits arising both from  increased  scale and  repetition.  Most series builders 
experience  a 3-5%  learning curve in direct hours  and  materials for each of the first 
few  units of production, with additional economies in  in-direct hours.  Comparing 
organisation and cost structures between series and one-off builders shows significant 
differences,  for  example  in  design  and  technical  resource,  purchasing,  the 
supervisor/worker ratios  and  the  degree  of sub-contracting.  However, neither is 
necessarily  a  route  to  success.  Yards  using  each  approach  appear  in  all  three 
performance  groups.  The  choice  of approach  is  subsidiary  to  overall business 
decisions on company strategy and marketing policy.  Series building is necessary in 
some markets  and virtually impossible in others.  What is clear from  our research is 
that those  yards  which try to  do  both and  have no clear focus  are  competitively the 
weakest. 
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8. 12  A  related  issue  is  whether the  EC  industry  has  the capacity to  meet the  demand 
increases identified in the AWES forecast.  On the basis of assumptions of: 
•  a constant market share; 
•  a 5% a year performance improvement and a parallel increase in capacity; 
•  no additional capacity from  naval yards; 
•  adapting to the changed mix of products required in the future; 
•  no changes in workforce sizes; 
the broad picture is for falling capacity utilisation through to the mid-1990s, a rise to 
current levels around 2000, then a further fall. 
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On this analysis the EC industry will have capacity to meet the peak requirement, but 
with significant excess capacity up  to  the year 2000.  If Japan does  considerably 
increase  capacity  through  productivity  increases  in  the  next  ten  years,  this  will 
probably have a significant adverse impact on the Community's industry. 
Access to markets 
8. 13  It is  quite clear that there are national markets which are closed to EC shipbuilders 
and  the responsibility  for improving  the position lies with national governments and 
the European Commission. 
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8 .14  It is also clear that there  are shipowner markets which are closed or closing to  EC 
builders because  of failures  of marketing in the broadest sense.  These include EC 
owners.  Whilst marketing is a clear best practice component, there is a potential need 
for  a non-shipyard  catalysing  agent  promoting  market research,  dissemination of 
information, training and technology transfer. 
Fair competition 
8 .15  The study has shown that there is a continuing need for a European Commission role 
to  monitor  and  negotiate  fair  trading  conditions  both  within the Community  and 
between  the  Community  and  the  Korean,  Japanese  and  other  shipbuilders.  A 
number  of examples  of continuing  unfair practices  have  been  identified  in this 
report. 
8.16  It is  clear that the  ability of some  shipbuilders  to  buy from  the  best suppliers  is 
seriously constrained by  the continuing existence of barriers  and different standards 
across  the Community.  We  are  aware that this  issue is  being addressed  by  a study 
commissioned earlier by DG III. 
Upgrading and innovation 
8.17  A major constraint on any  industry's long term ability to compete  successfully is its 
capacity  to  upgrade  and innovate,  in all  areas of the critical  success factors.  This 
requires  both  access to the relevant basic technologies and resources, and the skills 
within the operating companies to  convert these to meet shipowners' needs as part of 
best practice. 
8.18  The EC R &  D infrastructure which can support  the  shipbuilding  industry  has four 
main components: 
EC Framework Programmes 
eg BRITE EURAM, ESPRIT 
EUREKA projects 
National R &  D organisations 
eg CETANA, BMT-Cortec, 
Danish Maritime Institute 
Shipbuilders 
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The  initiatives  are  basically  designed  to  meet  demands  identified  by  companies 
and/or  research  organisations  operating  in  the  industry.  The  EC  shipbuilding 
industry  is  very  fragmented  with limited  systems  for  identifying  major common 
issues for the future.  The R&D committees (COREDES and ECMIR) are initial steps 
in  this  direction  and  the  'Euroship  2000'  concepts  are,  we  understand,  to  be 
included in the fourth framework programme for 1993/94. 
8.19  The Japanese R & D infrastructure would appear to exhibit three main differences of 
emphasis: 
•  the  major  national  programmes  mounted  by  the  Ministry  of Transport 
through  the main  research institutes  are  specified  in  terms  of markets  or 
applications to obtain competitive advantage; 
•  there is wide involvement in all the projects:  the project is led by  the MOT 
with  representatives  from  all  seven  major  shipbuilding  groups,  key 
shipowners and major suppliers; 
•  there  are  more  resources  at  company  level  for  developing  marketable 
products because  of the groupings structure and  the close relationship with 
the Heavy Industries groups and their R & D capability. 
8.20  There  are  elements  of  this  approach,  ie  clear  and  common  objectives, wide 
involvement and  improved implementation,  which could well be transferred  into the 
EC system.  The Bossard Study was a step in the right direction on the first two areas. 
The third  area requires  both improved  technology  transfer and  the development of 
greater R&D resources within the EC industry. 
8.21  Concern  was  expressed  on  the  availability  of finance  for  shipowners  for  future 
purchasing.  Whilst this mostly centered on the anticipated fleet renewal programme 
of the  late  1990s, there  was  also  concern at  the withdrawal  of smaller company 
schemes across  the  Community,  for example in Germany,  UK  with the BES  and 
Denmark's  KS  arrangements.  This  was  thought likely  to  be  a  major constraint 
particularly  in  the northern  European captain/owner sector.  The  generally tighter , 
credit environment and more restrictive banking practices were  said to be depressing 
current  ordering.  This appears to  be affecting smaller yards  in  particular and  the 
Construnaves initiative on guarantees is, in part, a response to this. 
8.22  Most  yards  have  identified  a priority  to  improve  training  and  in  most cases are 
supported  by national or regional initiatives, as well as the relevant trade association. 
In  most  areas  recruitment  of apprentices  is  proving  a  problem.  In  general  the 
industry sees  these as issues for the industry, with Commission activity restricted to 
promoting  a positive image of shipbuilding.  As has been identified earlier, there are 
regional  structural imbalances in the workforce,  particularly in  Spain and  Portugal 
and  concern that unfair arrangements  have been made for eastern Germany.  We are 
aware that this issue is currently in front of the Commission. 
8.23  A small number of yards  are  currently investing in upgrading facilities,  principally 
through self-funding or in conjunction with existing European Commission, national 
or  regional  funding  mechanisms.  We  do  not  believe  that  there  is  a  need  for 
additional action in this area. 
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Policy and regulatory framework 
8.24  One  source  of competitive  advantage  gained  by  shipbuilders  in  all  three  non-EC 
countries  is the relative scale and concentration of the  industry.  Detailed analysis of 
the survey findings (see Appendix 5) would  suggest that average labour productivity 
increases by about 2.2% for every  10% increase in total output.  Given the projected 
excess of industry capacity this would indicate that a positive approach to  industry 
rationalisation should form  part of an overall policy for the industry. 
8.25  Similar  arguments  have  been expressed  to  us  by  the  industry  but  in  favour  of 
rationalisation of the marine equipment supply  sector.  Within the constraints of this 
study it was not possible to review the case for action. 
8.26  Clearly the  industry  expressed  itself fully  supportive of the  rapid  introduction  of 
enhanced  IMO  regulations  on safety and  environmental protection.  These are seen 
as the prime means of accelerating fleet upgrading and the demand on shipbuilding. 
8.27  However, there is also concern at the lack of a fully  integrated transport  strategy for 
the Community.  There is strong aversion to take the risk of investing in creating new 
product  markets,  without the knowledge  that there is  a detailed  policy framework 
supporting  the  investment.  Critical comparison has  been  made  with the Japanese 
policy of 'modal shift', ie  the  transfer of road  freight  to  coastal shipping, and the 
consequent  identification of the need for fast  coastal freight transport, leading to the 
development programme of the  Techno-Super Liner.  The need is seen for a similar 
framework to guide and incentivise developments with the Community industry. 
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The policy development model 
8.28  In  summary there are  significant areas  in which the industry can improve  its level of 
international competitiveness.  However, there are  also areas of industry constraints 
where  Commission initiatives  would  be positively  beneficial.  The  relationship  is 
summarised in the model below, and options for policy development are discussed in 
the following section. 
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9  Options for policy development 
9. 1  Our  recommendations  have  been  structured  against  the areas  of need  identified 
earlier in this  report and  summarised in the  route  to competitiveness model shown 
below. 
Market access 
Internal 
competition 
Removing entry barriers 
Industry 
Initiatives 
External 
Initiatives 
9.2  The  objective  of the  EC  shipbuilding  industry  must  be  to  meet  the  needs  of 
worldwide shipowners better than  its competitors.  If allowed to compete  on a fair 
basis with the best in the world, the industry will be better placed to meet the needs of 
Community  shipowners, and  on  a more general  basis, the Community  marine  and 
transportation sectors.  We would therefore reject in principle any measures designed 
to  protect the EC industry in isolation. 
9. 3  However, it is clear that there are  markets  which are  not open  to  fair competition 
from  EC  shipbuilders,  even  where  the  EC  builder  has  demonstrably  superior 
technology,  quality and  pricing as  for example in  cruise ships and dredgers.  This 
report  has  illustrated the  effectiveness of entry  barriers (for example,  home credit 
schemes  and  national  shipbuilding  programmes)  to  the  Japanese  and  Korean 
shipowner  markets.  Continuing  priority  should  be  given  to  negotiating  their 
elimination  through  OECD  mechanisms,  multi-lateral  trade  fora  and  GATT 
procedures. 
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Market access 
Industry promotion 
9.4  Within Japanese shipowners there would appear to  be low awareness of the current 
capabilities of EC builders which is, in part,  a reflection of the  success of the entry 
barriers.  Given the scale of the problem and the strength of the Japanese market, it is 
unlikely  that  the  industry  would  be  able  to  fund  the  necessary  programme  to 
increase awareness and promote EC shipbuilders.  There is a case for establishing an 
'EC  Ship  Centre'  in  both  Japan  and  Korea  which  could  have  responsibilities 
including: 
promotion of the EC shipbuilding (and marine equipment) industries; 
•  identifying sourcing opportunities for EC shipbuilders; 
monitoring developments and competitiveness in the market. 
The  establishment of such centres  would  potentially  have  an important  signalling 
role in developing appropriate bi-lateral arrangements. 
Fair competition 
External 
9.5  The OECD framework is  designed to  provide  fair competition on financing  terms. 
There is evidence that orders  are being won in the EC market by Korean shipbuilders 
offering  terms  more attractive  than  OECD  guidelines.  The  Commission should 
pursue its  efforts  through OECD,  GATT and  bi-lateral negotiations to  identify and 
eliminate  such practices.  We  recommend  that  appropriate  analysis  or studies  be 
made  of  the  feasibility  of making  available  matching  credit  facilities  to  EC 
shipbuilders, in conformity with OECD rules. 
9.6  The measures taken under the  seventh directive  on shipbuilding  are  leading to  a 
convergence  of subsidies.  The  Commission's  policy  of  moving  to  eventual 
elimination of subsidies in line with the comparative price studies based on the most 
cost-effective  European  shipyards  would  appear  to  be effective  in that  the  most , 
efficient yards are cost competitive with Japan and many of the others are moving in 
the right direction.  We do not believe that additional operating subsidy measures are 
required. 
9. 7  Of equal importance for  shipowners are  home credit and  guarantee schemes which 
have  the  impact of minimising  cross-border transactions  within  the  Community. 
Whilst the total effect on the  EC market share is  probably not large,  we believe there 
is  an  impact through constraining  the  total  potential output of the  most efficient 
yards  should these  be located in  another EC  country.  We  recommend  that home 
credit schemes in those  aspects not covered  by  the seventh directive are hannonised 
across  the  Community.  In  addition  we  believe  that  schemes  should  be  non-
discriminatory,  applicable across internal borders  and available in all countries to all 
EC owners. 
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9. 8  Many  yards  experience  cost  penalties or  restrictions on sourcing  because of the 
continued  existence  of different  standards  for  materials and  equipment  across the 
Community.  We understand that this issue is under review in a study commissioned 
by 00111. 
9. 9  EC yards are  subject to  differential constraints on where they can resource materials 
and  equipment depending  on the country  in which they are located.  In most cases 
financing  conditions lay down an  80%  EC content for the complete  ship.  In other 
cases  national  quotas  are  imposed  or specific suppliers  are  enforced,  particularly 
where these  are  state owned  steel and  engine  manufacturers.  In contrast one major 
yard  makes 40%  of its purchases outside the  EC and then believes itself constrained 
by  steel quota agreements  with Brazil.  If  the EC supply industry  were competitive, 
these protectionist measures would be unnecessary.  From the perspective of a cost 
efficient shipbuilding  industry,  we  recommend  that the  Commission  reviews these 
measures  against 'state aids rules'  and  seeks to phase out these sourcing limitations 
in the same way as  is occurring with subsidies with the sixth and seventh directives. 
9. 10  Significant  steps  have  been  taken  in  recent  years  by  national  governments  to 
introduce  measures  to  allow  shipyards  to  deal  with  the  problem  of structural 
overmanning, as  for example in Italy with the  introduction of early retirement and 
pension provisions.  A similar situation continues in yards in Spain and Portugal and 
whilst relief measures have been introduced,  these are only  partial solutions and the 
competitiveness of particular yards  continues to  be  depressed.  This is  an issue for 
the  relevant national  government supported by  Commission regional  measures  as 
appropriate. 
Upgrading and innovation 
Technology transfer 
9.11  There  would  appear  to  be  little  real  transfer  of  either  ship  or  shipbuilding 
technology,  or an infrastructure to  achieve it, within the EC industry and particularly 
in comparison  with Japan.  What there  is tends  to  be organised  on national lines, is 
related· to  project problems and  the high profile  area is in links with Japanese yards 
with the technology  flow almost exclusively from  East to  West.  There would appear ' 
to  be  little  recognition  that there  are  'centres  of excellence'  in  best  practice in 
Europe and little motivation within those centres to distribute information. 
9. 12  Judging  by  the  general  reaction  of shipbuilders  included  in our programme,  the 
Maritime Industries Forum would  appear to  have been well received in terms of the 
information  exchange  and  process for  developing  common  views.  We  recommend 
that this concept is  extended into a  series of fora/conventions organised  on a pan-
European  basis  and  dedicated in tum to  each of the  areas of best practice within 
shipbuilding.  Each forum  would  focus  on  case studies from  one  or more  of the 
centres of excellence and  on practical implementation in different circumstances. 
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9.13  A  key  feature  of the  Japanese  structure  is  the  support  contract  for  transferring 
technology  between shipyards in the  same grouping,  or in some  cases in different 
groupings.  We  are aware of very few  examples within the  European Community. 
One  example  is  where  a  large  yard  is  assisting implementation of a CAD/CAM 
system in a medium size, non-competing shipyard.  We believe that this process of 
yard  to  yard  transfer  should  be  positively  encouraged  by  the  Commission  and 
particularly  where  cross-border transfers  of best practice  are  involved.  Existing 
Community  mechanisms are  available, for  example the  Sprint programme.  These 
should be  actively promoted by DGIII to the industry. 
Upgrading and innovation 
R&D sponsorship 
9.14  The  R&D framework  supporting the industry  is extensive and  multi-layered,  from 
the  European  Commission framework  programmes  through  to  commercialisation 
projects  within  shipyards.  The  system  seems  to  have  particular  strengths  in 
individual  technology  developments,  eg  ESPRIT  programmes  on ROCOCO  and 
NEUTRABRAS and  in product  design, eg the E3  EUREKA programme.  However, 
in our view there is a role that is not currently  being filled  and that is an overall co-
ordination role within a clear perspective of a future market. 
9.15  This role can be defined as to: 
•  clearly  articulate  a  future  market  demand,  for  example  for  road  to  sea 
transportation similar to the Japanese TSL project.  In most cases these would 
be developed out of the overall EC maritime industries and transport policies. 
The  articulation  would  require  a  specification of the needs  to  be  met and 
likely  market  size  and  would  demand  close  consultation  with potential 
owners; 
analyse the  required underlying technologies and identify the state of the art, 
proposing transfer from other industries as  appropriate; 
•  catalyse development where there are gaps in technologies; 
•  ensure  multi-point  diffusion  into  the  EC  industry  for  competitive 
commercialisation. 
9. 16  The Maritime Industries Forum is  a potential mechanism for  fulfilling this role.  On 
completion of its current programme, we  recommend that the results of the Forum 
are  reviewed against the role  that has been identified, with a view to  putting it onto a 
permanent basis. 
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Policy and regulation 
Industry structure policy 
9. 17  The  shipbuilding  industries  in  Japan,  Korea  and  Finland  are  very  much  more 
concentrated  than  in  the  EC, as  shown  by  the  relative  Herfindahl  indices.  The 
inference is that the yards in these countries can obtain significant benefits of scale in 
terms of marketing, purchasing and  production  economies.  The evidence from  the 
EC  results  also indicates that as  output  increases, productivity and competitiveness 
improve.  There is  an  a priori  case for  rationalisation.  However the indicated scale 
for the required  restructuring  and the geographical spread of the industry are such as 
to  raise concern on the real  feasibility of such proposals, particularly in comparison 
to  the  benefits  achievable  through  implementing best practices.  It is  clearly the 
responsibility  of the  industry to  determine  which route to  follow.  We believe that 
there  are opportunities  for further  rationalisation for  the industry  to  develop.  We 
recommend  that the Commission should  take  a sympathetic  position  on measures 
generated by participants in the industry, but further restructuring of the EC industry 
should not be a priority objective for public policy development. 
9.18  We  recommend  that  the  Commission is  supportive, within  existing  guidelines  on 
competition policy,  of co-operative arrangements  and  agreements between yards to 
develop economies of scale, for example in purchasing, or to  improve the utilisation 
of resources,  for  example  through  sub-contracting.  Such  activity  is  the  proper 
consequence  of reviewing best practices against the  commercial considerations and 
objectives of the individual yards. 
9.19  The  competitiveness  of the  EC  shipbuilding  industry  is  dependent  upon  the 
equipment  supply  industry.  Imports  of machinery  built in  Korea or Japan  under 
European  licences  are  increasing and  the  EC  industry  broadly  consists of a large 
variety of mostly medium-sized companies.  Measures we  have  suggested in section 
9.9 from  a shipbuilding perspective could adversely affect the supply industry.  The 
ability  of this  industry  to  meet  the  future  needs  of EC  shipbuilders  and  their 
incorporation into an overall maritime policy requires urgent review. 
Policy and regulation 
EC transport policy 
9.20  The  European  Commission  has  already  initiated  the  wider  debate  through  the 
Maritime  Industries Forum,  required  as a basis  to  develop a policy  to  improve the 
competitiveness of the EC maritime  sector.  This report  can only  re-emphasise the 
need for such an integrated approach. 
9.21  Maritime  transport  already  plays  a  major  role  in  both  the  internal  and  external 
communications  systems  of the  European  Community.  It can  offer  significant 
benefits both commercially and  in terms of environmental impact.  It is  as  much a 
part of the Community's integrated transport as  road, pipeline, rail and air. 
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9.22  We  would  recommend that  DGIII  looks  to  issue  a green paper following  up  the 
Maritime  Industries  Forum  and  parallel research  programmes,  which  will assist in 
creating an appropriate business environment for the EC shipbuilding industry by: 
•  providing a longer term policy framework for market development; 
•  promoting the transfer of technology;  and 
•  being a major component for a fully integrated EC transport policy. 
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Overall methodology 
Appendix  1, Page 1 
The  overall methodology  adopted  for  the  study,  in line with  our proposed  approach,  is 
detailed below: 
Data gathering on focus 
industries (product segments, 
markets) 
I 
Information requirements and 
interview schedules discussed 
withCESA 
I 
EC yard visit programme 
agreed with national 
associations 
I 
I 
Visits and 
discussions with 
selected yards 
I 
Survey analysis and 
conclusions 
l 
Additional interviews 
and contacts 
I 
Report to the EEC's 
DGIII 
I 
Visit programme 
developed for Korea, 
Finland and Japan 
Interviews with selected 
shipowners and industry 
suppliers k.PJWG I  Peat Marwick 
Programme of contacts 
Appendix 2, Page 1 
1  European Community shipyards 
A sample structure of 40 EC shipyards was targeted with the objectives of: 
•  covering the majority part of EC production; 
•  giving  representation to  yards  of all  size types  and  product  types  in  the 
European industry; 
•  giving representation to all operating environments and types of ownership; 
•  giving representation to yards across the apparent spectrum of performance; 
•  but focusing on yards competing directly with Japanese,  Korean or Finnish 
shipbuilders. 
The yards that were eventually included in the sample were: 
Country  Yard  Country  Yard 
Portugal  Solisnor  Denmark  Odense Lindo 
Viana do Castello (ENVC)  B unneister & Wain 
Est Sao Jacinto  Dan yard 
Spain  AESA - Puerto Real  Orskov Christensens 
AESA - Bilbao  Aarhus Flydedok 
SA Juliana  Gennan  Thyssen Nordseewerke 
AstAnnon  BrandWerft 
Naval Gijon  MTW-Wismar 
France  Chantiers De L'Atlantique  MeyerWerft 
Leroux et Lotz  J J Sietas 
Belgium  Rupelmonde  HDW 
BSC  Bremer Vulkan 
Boelwerf  Italy  Fincantieri Monfalcone 
UK  Cochrane  Pesaro 
Richard Dunston  Mario Morini 
Harland and Wolff SID  SEC 
K  vaemer Govan 
Netherlands  Ferus Smit 
Damen - Gorinchem 
IHC - Kinderdijk 
van der Giessen de Noord 
Shipyard K Damen 
Merwede Shipyard 
Greece  Hellenic Shipyards 
In  total  these  yards  directly employ  43,900  people  in  merchant  shipbuilding  and 
represented  56% of the EC order book as  at January  1992.  Additional visits were 
made to  two  subsidiary yards  of above companies  and  to  the  group  head  offices of 
Fincantieri  in Trieste  and  AESA  in  Madrid.  However,  detailed  analysis was not 
completed  for the two  subsidiary yards  and the results  are not included in the detail 
of the report. /(})JWGI Peat Marwick 
Programme of contacts 
Appendix 2, Page 2 
Sample structure by size of yard order book: 
Order book  Total  EC  yards  Sample  yards 
Over 200,000 CGT  12  9 
100- 199,000 CGT  16  8 
20- 99,000 CGT  32  10 
Under 20.000 CGT  144  12 
Total  204  40 
Sample structure by ownership: 
Ownership  Total  EC  yards  Sample  yards 
Independent builder  158  14 
Shipbuilding group  23  9 
Shipowner  10  6 
Small engineering group  9  7 
Larp;e engineering gr~up  4  4 
%  covera2e 
75 
50 
31 
8 
20 
%  covera2e 
9 
39 
60 
77 
100 
Visits to  shipyards were  carried  out  by  two  teams  of two  consultants  who  were 
interchanged  at  intervals  during  the  programme  to  ensure  consistency  of 
assessments.  The visits to yards had three main elements: 
•  discussions  with senior general managers  and  the  managers of each  of the 
main  functional  areas covering business objectives,  strategies  and policies, 
performance and perceived constraints; 
•  examination  of documents  (where  allowed)  covering  for  example  master 
plans,  personnel  records,  quotation  documents,  CAD/CAM,  design  and 
planning system outputs and purchasing records; 
visits to departments, workshops and the shipyard. 
2  Japanese shipyards 
The sample structure for Japanese shipyards had the objectives of: 
•  covering the  majority of the  major shipbuilding groups:  member yards  of 
four groups accounting for 63% of the industry order book were visited; 
•  covering  a broad  product  range of relevance across  the  European  industry 
and where there is direct competition:  yards visited are significant builders 
of VLCCs, other tankers, gas carriers, bulkers, containerships, passenger ships 
and reefers; 
•  providing a basis for a detailed analysis of use of best practice in at least 10% 
of the industry:  yards visited accounted for 12% of the  industry order book 
as  at January 1992; J<J;MG I  Peat Marwick 
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•  within other objectives, providing representation  of the different levels of 
yards  within the Japanese group  structure to  identify potential synergies and 
benefits:  the sample included one lead yard, two second tier yards  and  one 
third tier yard. 
The yards included in the detailed analysis were: 
Kawasaki Group 
Mitsubishi Group 
Mitsui Group 
NKKGroup 
Kawasaki, Sakaide 
Mitsubishi, Kobe 
Shikoku, Takamatsu 
Hashihama, Todatsu 
In addition,  executives interviewed provided significant comparative information on 
other yards in their groups, excepting Hashihama. 
The visits to the shipyards were carried out in exactly the same way  and with exactly 
the same elements as visits to EC yards. 
3  Korean shipyards 
The  two  major Korean  yards,  Daewoo and  Hyundai  were included  in the sample. 
Between them  they  account  for  68%  of the  national industry  and  employ  21,000 
people. 
The approach and structure of visits was identical to the EC programme. 
4  Finnish shipyards 
The  two major Finnish companies, K  vaemer Mas a and  Finn  yards  were included in 
the sample.  Between them they account for  about 80%  of the  national industry and 
employ 3,200 people. 
The approach and structure of visits were identical to the EC programme. k})Jkl; I  Peat Marwick 
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5  Shipowners 
A number of shipowners  were contacted during  the study in order to  gain further 
understanding of the  purchasing process  and  the factors  detennining the choice of 
shipyard  for new building.  Given the fragmented  nature of the industry the contacts 
cannot  be  said  to  be  a  statistically representative  sample.  The  focus  was  on 
shipowners  with  relevant  experience  of  EC,  Korean,  Japanese  and  Finnish 
shipbuilders.  Contacts made included: 
J Lauritzen 
NavixLines 
Eletson Corporation 
Carnival Cruise 
Mobil Oil 
NYK 
Bergesen 
Anangel Shipping 
Chandris SA 
Soponata 
Seatrade Groningen 
CMB Transport 
Greek Union of  Shioowners 
P&O 
Denholm Ship Management 
Mitsui OSK 
Neptune Orient 
Sealand Service 
Worldwide Shipping 
Evergreen 
HapagLloyd 
DSR Lines 
Peter Dohle Schiffahrts 
Metropolitan Shipping 
K-Line 
ECSA 
6  In  addition,  we  have  received  views  and  information  from  a  wide  variety  of 
respondents  covering a very broad  spectrum of industry interest groups  including 
AWES, CESA, EC national shipbuilding  associations, Institute of Shipbuilding  and 
Logistics,  Lloyds  Maritime  Services, Fairplay,  JSMEA,  US  lTC,  JETRO,  Korean 
Shipbuilding  Association,  Japan  Ship  Centre,  TecnEcon  and  many  others.  Our 
KPMG  offices  in  Seoul  and  Tokyo  provided  information  from  industry  and  , 
government sources.  We are grateful to them all for the considerable help they have 
provided. k.k.MG I  Peat Marwick 
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The methodology  used in the study to assess the relative use of best practice in each of the 
yards  visited is  a development of an approach used by members of the consulting team in 
earlier  shipbuilding  industry  studies  in  the  US,  Brazilian,  UK  and  Spanish  merchant 
shipbuilding industries. 
The underlying  principle is that for  each of the  detailed areas  of shipyard  operation that 
have in previous studies been shown to have an impact on overall performance measures, an 
assessment  is  made  of the  actual  yard  practice  against  industry  best  practice  for  that 
particular operation.  A scale of 1 to  4  has  been  used  corresponding  with the following 
broad definitions: 
Technology level 1 
Technology level 2 
Technology level 3 
Technology level 4 
use  only  the most basic  systems or technologies/absence of 
policies/ad hoc decision making. 
better than basic but below industry norms. 
better than industry averages but not up to leading standards. 
state of the  art use  of technology/clear standards, parameters 
for  decision  making/industry  leading  facilities, techniques 
and systems. 
These assessments have then been combined at three additional levels to provide increasingly 
macro-level  assessments of the  use  of best practices  in  each  yard.  The  levels of detail 
therefore are: 
Tier 4 
Tier 3 
Tier 2 
Tier 1 
detailed operational assessments. 
sub-department  level  assessments, eg  steelwork  production,  design 
and  draughting  technology. 
department/functional level, eg marketing, purchasing, production. 
shipyard level. 
In  each  case  the  higher  level  assessments  are  obtained  by  a  simple  averaging  of the 
assessments in the tier below. 
The full catalogue of operational assessments utilised is: 
Tier 1 
Overall 
Tier 2 
Strategy and management 
Marketing 
Purchasing 
Human resources 
Design and technical kbJWi I  Peat Marwick 
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Tier 2  Tier 3 
Planning 
Production 
Strategy and management  - Strategy 
Marketing 
Purchasing 
Human resources 
Design/fechnical 
Planning 
- Management 
- Market information 
- Product development 
- Sales/marketing approach 
- Enquiry systems 
- Estimating systems 
- Image presentation 
- After sales service 
- Purchasing philosophy 
- Item definition 
- Restrictions/constraints 
- Supplier selection 
- Purchasing skills 
- Purchase power 
- Sub-contract policies 
- Supplier management 
- Training policies 
- Recruitment policies 
- Employee empowerment 
- Design time/planning 
- Design/draughting 
technology 
- Production engineering/ 
standards 
- Philosophy and levels 
- Shipbuilding strategy  I 
technology 
Tier 4 
- Ship design 
- Steelwork 
- Outfit 
- Parts lists 
- Steel manufacturing data 
- Outfit manufacturing data 
- Planning philosophy 
- Resource allocation 
- Work authorisation 
- Control systems 
- Build strategy 
- Production methods kJ'MJi I  Peat Marwick 
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Production  - Steelwork production 
- Outfit production/stores 
- Other pre-erection 
- Ship construction 
- Miscellaneous 
- Stockyards 
- Plate cutting 
- Profile cutting 
- Forming 
- Sub-assembly 
- Flat unit assembly 
- Curved assembly 
- 3D assembly 
- Pipework 
- Outfit steel 
- Sheetmetal work 
- Joinery 
- Electrical 
- Outfit unit assembly 
- Stores 
- Outfit parts marshalling 
- Block assembly 
- Painting 
- Pre-erection outfit 
- Unit and block storage 
- Ship construction 
- Erection and joining 
- Services 
- Staging/access 
- Engine room  outfit 
- HulVaccommodation outfit 
- After launch 
- Tools/production aids 
- Workforce appearance 
- Material control 
- Materials handling 
- Layout and material flow 
- General environment 
- Noise, ventilation, fumes 
- Amenities klJJW; I  Peat Marwick 
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Performance Measurement 
During  the  yard  visit programme,  a  significant data  set was  collected  on  a  number  of 
perfonnance measures.  During discussions on the use of measures it was again apparent that 
yards  use a wide variety of measures to target and monitor performance;  that there is great 
variety in the way  these measures  are  calculated in  individual  yards;  and  great scepticism 
both  about  specific  performance  measures  used by  other yards  and  the  value of general 
industry  measures  at all.  Given this  background  and  the  study  objective of providing  a 
broad comparison of national industry performance, not a specific yard by yard comparison, 
our assessment has focussed  on three  broad measures:  total man hours per CGT produced; 
man  hours  per tonne  steel;  and  cycle  times.  Of these  analysis _shows  there  is  a clearer 
relationship between use of best practice in a yard and the total man hours per CGT. 
In  estimating this  measure  a number  of conventions  have been  adopted  to  allow for the 
significant variations that exist from  yard to  yard.  These are: 
•  Determination of man hours: 
•  the base figure is total yard employment and actual annual hours worked; 
•  an  estimate was made  with yard  management of the  amount of work sub-
contracted  in  or out in each area, eg  steelwork, painting, electrical;  and the 
hours adjusted accordingly; 
•  where  a yard benefits from  head  office services, eg management, purchasing, 
design, an estimated adjustment has been made; 
•  only  full  or  part time  employment  on  merchant  new  building  has  been 
included.  All other activity, eg repair,  naval building,  industrial  work, has 
been excluded. 
•  Determination of CGT: 
•  1984 OECD co-efficients have been used; 
•  where master plans were available (most cases) the calculation has been based 
on  the work  input  requirement  for  the  current  12  month  period  (ie  not 
deliveries); 
•  where master plans were not available (a few cases) the calculation was based 
on  recorded  deliveries  for  1991  (or an  average  of 1990/91  if there  were 
significant differences in year  to  year deliveries) modified  according to  an 
estimate of the work done on each vessel at the beginning of the period, and 
an estimate of the work remaining on each vessel at the end of the period. 
In  using  CGT, we  are aware  that the  co-efficient  is  designed  for broad  level international 
comparisons  and not for national or shipyard output measurements.  We also understand that 
the  actual  co-efficients  are  being  reviewed  in  the  light of changes  in  ship  technology. 
However,  we do  not believe that there is  any better generally accepted  standard, and  there is 
widespread use of CGT in this fonn throughout the industry. kl'M& I  Peat Marwick 
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It is recognised that this approach is not perfect but it is  believed to be sufficiently indicative 
for  the broad purposes of this study  and has the  merit that it has  been  applied uniformly 
across yards in all the countries under review. 
The distribution  of yards  by man-hour per CGT and  best practice ratings  were reviewed. 
From  this, three  approximately  equal  groupings  were derived  with the  following  broad 
characteristics. 
Overall  best  ~ractice ratin2 
Man hours per  Main  international  Smaller 
CGT  ~yards 
1yards 
EC above average  20-40  2.9 : 3.8  2.2: 3.1 
group 
EC average group  40-50  1.9 : 3.1  1.7:2.4 
EC below average  50- 115  1.9 : 2.8  1.5: 2.2 
.lUOUP 
The analysis of the EC yards visited during the sutvey is as below: 
Number of , ards  %  of total CGT production 
Main  International  Smaller  Main  International  Smaller 
EC above average  8  5  36  5 
group 
EC average group  6  6  26  4 
EC below average 
group  9  5  27  2 
Detailed ratings  for  each yard  surveyed  are  shown in  Appendix  4  with the exception of 
Hellenic which at the time of visit was not producing merchant new buildings. Appendix 4 
Performance and ratings summary 
EC- main 'international' shipyards 
Best Practice Ratings  Yard 
reference 
number 
Man hours 
per 
CGT 
Overall  Strategy/  Marketing  Purchasing  Human  Design and 
EC Above Average Group 
38  26 
15  27 
24 
12 
43 
30 
32 
33 
17  34 
32  35 
37  37 
EC Average Group 
40  40 
42  40 
40  44 
39  44 
4  46 
44  47 
EC Below Average Group 
31  55 
35 
41 
23 
9 
16 
5 
2 
6 
57 
57 
60 
75 
81 
85 
95 
112 
3.7 
3 
3.2 
3.4 
2.9 
3.8 
3.1 
3.3 
2.6 
2.7 
2.9 
1.9 
3.1 
3.1 
2.2 
2.8 
2.2 
2.7 
2.7 
2.7 
2.9 
1.9 
2.1 
Management  Resources  Technical 
4 
3.5 
4 
4 
3.5 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3.5 
3 
1.5 
3 
2.5 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3 
3.2 
1.5 
1.5 
3.9 
2.7 
3.7 
3 
2.7 
3.8 
3.1 
3.5 
2.3 
2.7 
2.6 
1.7 
2.5 
2.7 
3.3 
2.4 
1.4 
2.4 
2.5 
2.3 
2.5 
1.5 
2.4 
3.5 
3.4 
3 
3 
2.9 
3.7 
3.3 
3.3 
2.1 
3 
3 
2.3 
2.7 
3.3 
2.2 
2.9 
2.1 
2.8 
2.6 
2.4 
2.4 
2 
2 
3 
2.7 
3.3 
3 
1.7 
3.7 
3 
3.7 
3 
2.7 
2.7 
2 
3.3 
3 
2.7 
3 
2.8 
1.7 
3 
2 
1.3 
3.9 
2.9 
2.9 
3.4 
3.5 
3.4 
3.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.2 
3.5 
1.9 
3.6 
3.3 
2.5 
3.4 
2.4 
3.2 
3.4 
2.5 
3.5 
2.5 
2.5 
EC - smaller shipyards 
Yard  Man hours  Best Practice Ratings 
Planning 
4 
2.8 
3 
3.8 
3.3 
4 
3.8 
3.7 
2.2 
1.8 
2.8 
1.25 
3.8 
3.5 
2 
3.7 
2.7 
3.2 
3.8 
3 
3.8 
2.5 
2.8 
Production 
3.7 
2.7 
2.7 
3.3 
2.9 
3 
3 
2.3 
2.5 
2.4 
2.8 
2.3 
3.1 
3 
1.8 
2.6 
2.3 
2.8 
2.1 
2.8 
2.7 
2.2 
2.2 
reference  per  Overall  Strategy/  Marketing  Purchasing  Human  Design and  Planning  Production 
number  CGT 
EC Above Average Group 
20  23 
8 
18 
11 
34 
EC Average Group 
23 
26 
31 
32 
19  41 
33  42 
14  44 
7  47 
36  50 
45  N/A 
EC Below Average Group 
13  54 
47 
21 
10 
48 
61 
68 
70 
N/A 
2.6 
2.6 
3.1 
2.2 
2.2 
2.3 
2.1 
1.7 
1.9 
2.4 
1.9 
1.6 
1.9 
2.2 
1.6 
1.5 
Management  Resources  Technical 
3.5 
3.5 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1.5 
3 
3 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.9 
3.4 
3.3 
1.9 
1.7 
2.9 
2.1 
1.2 
1.7 
2.3 
1.5 
1.7 
2.1 
2.3 
1.4 
1.3 
3.6 
2.3 
3.1 
2.9 
2.5 
2.7 
2.6 
1.7 
2.4 
3.1 
2.2 
1.7 
2.1 
2.1 
1.5 
1.7 
1 
2.5 
2.8 
2 
2 
1.3 
2 
1.7 
1.3 
2.7 
1.3 
1.3 
2 
2.4 
2.4 
3.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2 
2.2 
2 
2.4 
2 
2.2 
2.1 
2.5 
2.2 
2.1 
2.1 
Japan/Korea/Finland shipyards 
Japan  28 
Japan  27 
Japan  29 
Japan  30 
Korea  26 
Korea  25 
F1nland  1 
Finland  3 
20 
22 
24 
24 
43 
47 
32 
43 
35 
2.9 
3.2 
28 
2.9 
2.8 
3.3 
2.8 
3.5 
3 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
2 
3.3 
2.9 
3 
2.6 
3.6 
3.3 
3.7 
2.7 
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3.9 
2.8 
3 
3.7 
2.5 
2.2 
2.8 
2.3 
3.7 
3.2 
3.3 
1.7 
3 
3 
2.7 
2.3 
3.2 
2.6 
3.1 
2.8 
2.8 
2.8 
3.5 
3.8 
2.2 
2.6 
3 
2.7 
2 
2.2 
2 
2.3 
2.2 
1.7 
1.5 
1.8 
1.8 
2.3 
2.5 
1.5 
3.7 
3.2 
3.7 
3.3 
2.8 
2.5 
3.5 
3.5 
2.6 
1.8 
2.!J 
1.9 
2 
1.7 
1.9 
1.9 
2 
2.2 
2 
1.9 
2 
2.2 
1.5 
2.1 
3.1 
2.9 
3.2 
2.3 
2.9 
3 
3.1 
2.8 APPENDIX 5 
Relationship Between Output and Productivity 
This section assesses the nature of the relationship between output and labour productivity 
and its  implications for EC yard competitiveness.  The methodology for this analysis  is  best 
viewed in terms of the neo-classical theory of cost curves.  This simply considers the long-run 
cost curve as being an envelope of short-run cost curves where, in the short run, at least one 
factor is fixed i.e. the capital stock.  The relationship between labour productivity and output 
differs between the short run and long run cases.  Generally we can assume that when the 
capital stock is fiXed, average labour productivity falls after a point reflecting the fact that the 
productivity of the last worker falls  as  employment increases.  In the longer run, however, 
average  labour productivity  can  increase  as  the  capital  stock  is  expanded  reflecting  the 
existence of economies of scale.  This implies  that unit labour costs will  also fall  as  output 
expands. 
Our purpose is  therefore to test the hypothesis that unit labour costs fall as output expands 
on the basis of a sample of yards across the EC, Japan, Korea and Finland.  In order to test 
this relationship we must make a number of simplifying assumptions.  This implies that we 
effectively are testing  for  a joint hypothesis.  The first  assumption we  make  is  that each 
output-productivity observation  for  a yard  represents  a  point  on a  short  run  cost  curve 
conditional  on  the  capital  stock.  Secondly  we  assume  that  each  yard  has  identical 
production/management technologies.  This allows us to assume that there is a single long run 
I 
cost curve which  is  the envelope of a number of shorter run cost curves about which  the 
individual observations lie.  Thirdly we assume that any yard is effectively operating at or near 
the optimal capacity of the plant in the sense that, given the short run cost curve, the output 
level minimises unit costs. 
Our approach  to testing  the above  hypothesis  is  to use ordinary least squares  regression 
analysis with output as  the explanatory variable and the inverse of labour productivity as the 
dependent variable.  We use the natural logarithm of compensated gross tonnage (CGT) p.a. 
by yard as the output measure and the natural logarithm of the inverse of labour productivity 
as the explanatory variable (i.e employment divided by CGT p.a.).  This serves as a proxy for 
unit labour costs.  By  using the logarithmic functional  form we  are directly estimating the 
sensitivity of productivity to output.  We performed these regressions  across  all  yards  and 
individually for  the EC and  non-EC countries.  In addition we split  the yards  between the large, internationally competitive yards as well as  the smaller yards.  The former were again 
split between EC and non-EC. The results for the regressions are given in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Regression Results for Labour Productivity and Output Relationship 
Sample  Intercept  T-ratio  coefficient on  T-ratio  No.  Obs.  R-
log(CGT p.a)  squared 
Whole  -2.63  -6.12  -.105  -1.80  45  .07 
sample 
EC  -3.29  -8.42  -.034  -.514  37  .007 
Non-EC  -6.14  -16.2  .163  1.05  8  .154 
International  -1.25  -2.82  -.224  -2.53  31  .16 
Yarcls 
International  -1.14  -3.16  -.223  -2.04  23  .16 
Yarcls (EC) 
Small Yards  -1.43  -3.90  -.246  -1.33  14  .129 
The results  indicate  that  the hypothesis  that labour  productivity  rises  with  output  is  not 
rejected at the 10% level of significance for the whole sample and similarly, at the 1% level 
of significance for the international yards alone.  In addition within the EC international yards 
alone the hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level of significance.  In general we can thus 
conclude that the lower level of labour productivity both within the EC yards is related to a 
lower level of output with respect to both the non-EC yards as well as with respect to some 
of the larger EC international yards. 
We can similarly infer from  the above the implications for overall unit costs.  For simplicity 
we assume that other unit costs are constant.  Hence if labour costs represent about 30% of 
total unit costs we can infer that, on the basis of the whole sample, a 10% increase in output 
will reduce unit costs by 0.3 times 1%.  Assuming a 9% cost differential between EC and non-
EC yards, a 9% unit cost reduction would require a 300% increase in output for an average 
EC yard.  If we  only  consider  the  international  yards  where  a  10%  increase  in  output 
increases productivity by 2.2%, this would require approximately a 136% increase in  output 
for an average EC yard. This raises  an interesting issue since,  in  terms of the sample alone,  the non-EC yards on 
average only had a 14.1% higher level of output and a 15.8% lower level of unit labour costs 
than EC yards.  This effectively implies  that either there are additional  unit cost savings 
arising from the other factors of production which we have ignored or the EC and non-EC 
yards lie on different long run cost curves.  The latter is consistent with EC and non-EC yards 
employing different best practice management techniques which,  by  necessity, we  assumed 
away for the regression analysis. APPENDIX6 
Concentration Indices for Production 
Concentration indices have implications for the demand and supply side of an industry.  In 
general these indices can be used to proxy for the degree of competitiveness or the extent of 
economies of scale  in  an  industry  within  a  country.  Here we  calculate  indices  for  the 
shipbuilding sector in the EC, Japan, South Korea and Finland.  On the one hand we can 
interpret these as  representing the degree to which economies of scale are currently being 
exploited within those countries.  On the other hand they also serve to illustrate the likely 
bargaining  power  which  each  national  industry  may  enjoy  with  regard  to  both  potential 
customers as well as suppliers. 
Table 2 details the Herfindahl indices for concentration in production under two alternative 
assumptions.  The first  considers yards  individually and thus indicates the extent to which 
there is concentration on a yard by yard basis.  The second aggregates yards belonging to the 
same  company  and  thus  attempts  to  reflect  concentration  in  terms  of purchasing  and 
marketing  power.  The  Herfindahl  index  measures  the  sum  of the  squared  shares  in 
production across yards.  An index of 100% indicates that all  production is carried out by a 
single  yard  while  an  index  of 0%  implies  that  all  yards  have  a  fraction  of the  overall 
production. 
Table 2:  Herfindahl Indices for Concentration 
Index (single yard basis)  Index (company yard 
basis) 
EC  1.78%  3.83% 
Japan  3.68%  12.83% 
South Korea  28.59%  28.59% 
Finland  14.25%  14.25% 
The index for single yards indicates the wide dispersion of production by yard in the EC and 
Japan.  The second index however reflects the very high degree of concentration within Japan 
when we group yards by company. APPENDIX 7 
Market Share and Exchange Rates 
This section presents our findings on the relationship between market shares in shipbuilding 
and exchange rate movements.  Table 3 details the movements in market shares, defined as 
the percentage on new orders in any given year, and exchange rate indices (with respect to 
the dollar, 1980=1.00) across the four blocks, EC, Japan, South Korea and Scandinavia (ie. 
Finland, Norway and Sweden).  We use the Ecu exchange rate for the EC and a composite 
exchange  rate  for  Scandinavia  defined  as  a  weighted  average  of the  three  constituent 
countries. 
Table 3: Market Shares and Exchange Rate Indices 
EC  Japan  South  Scand-
Korea  ana  via 
%  mkt.  Ecu  % mkt.  Yen  % mkt  Won  % mkt.  Ave. 
share  share  share  share 
1980  23.1  1.00  46.7  1.00  6.5  1.00  7.7  1.00 
1981  23.2  1.24  41.4  .97  6.4  1.12  9.0  1.17 
1982  20.8  1.42  42.1  1.10  8.7  1.20  4.9  1.33 
'  1983  12.7  1.56  49.8  1.05  14.5  1.28  3.5  1.54 
1984  15.1  1.76  51.3  1.05  10.0  1.33  5.4  1.69 
1985  21.1  1.83  43.0  1.05  7.8  1.43  2.9  1.76 
1986  16.7  1.42  36.2  .74  14.3  1.45  4.2  1.47 
1987  20.2  1.21  32.0  .64  19.9  1.35  8.7  1.31 
1988  24.8  1.17  36.8  .57  13.2  1.20  2.6  1.26 
1989  20.3  1.26  43.3  .61  12.3  1.11  4.2  1.32 
1990  19.3  1.09  42.8  .64  15.2  1.17  3.2  1.19 
1991  16.8  1.12  37.4  .59  18.6  1.25  2.1  1.18 Using  the  above  data  we  carry  out simple  regressions  to  determine  the  nature  of the 
relationship between market share and exchange rate movements for Japan and the EC.  The 
analysis includes future exchange rate movements of up to three years to capture the impact 
of anticipated exchange rate movements.  This might be important for example in  affecting 
the current value of orders as well as the actual costs incurred during the production phase 
specifically related to imported materials.  Table 4 presents our findings for each case under 
two specifications.  The first  is  to test the hypothesis of a simple correlation between the 
contemporaneous exchange rate and market share.  The second  represents the preferred 
specification  of a  more  general  equation  which  initially  included  all  three  leads  of the 
exchange rate as well as the contemporaneous value.  Note that since we are using exchange 
rate indices an increase in  the index represents a depreciation of the currency and thus a 
positive coefficient implies that the market share increase with depreciation. 
Table 4:  Exchange Rate and Market Share Results 
Country  Intercept  ER  ER+1  ER+2  ER+3  R-
squared 
EC  .278  -.062  .20 
(8.30)  (-1.60) 
EC  .243  -.178  .149  .62 
(8.37)  (-3.04)  (2.72) 
Japan  .273  .175  .45 
(6.22)  (2.87) 
Japan  .254  .353  -.178  .82 
(8.12)  (5.10)  (  -2.50) 
T-ratios in parentheses 
There are specifically two conclusions of interest to be drawn.  Firstly, for Japan, a very strong 
positive relationship appears to exist between the current exchange rate (or more generally 
a short term future exchange rate) and market share.  Over the longer term the impact of the 
exchange rate is positive.  Secondly there does not appear to be any such relationship for the 
EC.  Instead  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  market  share  and  the longer  term exchange rate countered by a smaller negative relationship with a short term (two-year lead) 
exchange rate.  We would interpret this as being consistent with the fact  that billing periods 
are longer in  the EC then in  Japan and that the impact of exchange rate movements on 
material costs occurs relatively earlier (justifying a separate negative effect).  Over the longer 
run the impact of the exchange rate is  relatively insignificant although slightly negative. 
The fact that Japan's market share, overall, is strongly related to movements in the exchange 
rate  compared  with  the  EC  has  fundamental  implications  for  future  market  share 
developments.  Specifically if the yen depreciates against the dollar we could infer that Japan's 
market share is  more likely to increase.  Current forecasts for the yen are however mixed. 
Goldman Sachs forecast a depreciation of 4.8% in  the Yen against the dollar over the next 
18 months while the OECD forecasts an appreciation of between 3-4% in  1993.  Over the 
longer  term,  the  London  Business  School  also  forecast  that  the  Yen  will  continue  to 
strengthen with an appreciation of about 7.6% by 1999.  Note that a 1% depreciation in the 
yen  (appreciation) effectively implies a 0.175%  increase (decrease) in  market share in  the 
immediate period. SHIPYARDS 
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